"And if we occasionally speak of Baldur ..."

"In Christ, the embodiment of all manliness, we find all that we need. And if we occasionally speak of Baldur, our words always contain some joy, some satisfaction, that our pagan ancestors were already so Christian as to have an indication of Christ in this ideal figure."
[Dietrich Eckart, founding member of German Nazi Party]

• Inside an anti-Pagan hatchet-job

This post is prompted by a recent article by Brian Powell for MediaMatters.Org: "The Supremacy Cause: Inside The White Nationalist Movement."

Despite the specificity of its proximate inspiration, this essay actually digs deeply into the broad issue of the attitudes toward Christianity and Paganism found among certain elements of the racist right in 21st century American politics. What is shown below is that any apparent criticism of Christianity, or apparent sympathy for Paganism, found among far-right white-supremacist groups and publications (like the National Policy Institute, The Occidental Quarterly, American Renaissance, and Alternative Right) is not at all what it appears to be.

And speaking of things that are not as they appear: on the surface, at least at first, Brian Powell's MediaMatters article, referred to (and linked to) at the beginning of this post, presents itself as a fairly straight-forward bit of investigative reporting.

You see, Powell had registered for the first ever nationwide conference of a white nationalist group called the National Policy Institute (NPI). He attended the conference without revealing the fact that he was in fact there to expose the ideas and activities of an organization whose ideas and activities he, quite justifiably, loathes. "As a clean-cut white male, my presence wasn't suspicious and the other attendees assumed I shared their views. For my part, I let them assume, and I did my best to blend in."

So far, so good. But about two-thirds of the way into his article, Powell suddenly veers off on a 1000+ word tangent under the heading "By the Hammer of Thor", in which he insinuates that this racist organization is in some way connected with and/or influenced by Paganism. Ostensibly this little anti-Pagan rant by Powell was prompted by a chance encounter with some conference attendees who happened to be members of an American Heathen group known as the Asatru Folk Assembly (AFA). (In this post I am using the words "Heathen" and "Pagan" interchangeably. "Heathen", or, to be precise, Heiden, is, after all, simply the German word for "Pagan".)

However, we find out that Powell never actually interrogated these Pagans about their religious beliefs or their organizational affiliations, because he did not want to blow his cover by asking a lot of questions. Instead, Powell admits that he only surmised, if it can even be called that, that they were members of the AFA after "craning my neck to watch them writing down information on their group for another young attendee". In fact, it is painfully obvious that all of the "information" about Heathenry and the AFA in Powell's article comes from a few minutes worth of googling, and not from anything that Powell learned at the NPI conference.

Incredibly, Powell made no effort to contact the AFA for an official response. Had he done so, he would have received confirmation that there were, indeed, a grand total of four AFA members who attended the conference as individuals without any official blessing from the ASA itself, as AFA leader Stephen McNallen later stated in a public response to Powell's article. Obtaining such a confirmation, or at least attempting to do so, seems like an obvious thing that any high-school journalism student would have done automatically, especially considering the fact that Powell thought it appropriate to devote about one fourth of a fairly long article (over 4000 words) to the supposed connection between racism and Heathenry.

Worse, though, is the fact that while Powell obsesses over his chance encounter with four Heathens at this conference, he completely ignores the very real connection between the National Policy Institute and Christianity.

• What Brian Powell doesn't know about the National Policy Institute
The National Policy Institute has ten guiding "Principles", the first of which is: "The West is a cultural compound of our Classical, Christian, and Germanic past."

The only religion mentioned in the "Principles" of the NPI is Christianity. Hmmm. What can we make of that? Perhaps we can gain more insight into the religious dimension of NPI's world-view by looking at the two men who co-authored their "Statement of Principles": William H. Regnery II and Samuel T. Francis.

Regnery is best known (to the extent that he is known at all) as the founder of the Charles Martel Society, which in turn is best known (to the extent that it is known at all) for it's flagship publication, The Occidental Quarterly (TOQ).

So, who was Charles Martel? His rise to power as the ruler of the Franks in the eighth century has been described by Princeton University historian Peter Brown (in his The Rise of Western Christendom) as "the greatest political revolution to occur in western Europe since the passing of the Roman empire." Brown goes on to say:

"The unprecedented coagulation of military power in the hands of the Frankish aristocracy who supported Charles Martel; the replacement of the Merovingian kings of Francia by a new, 'Carolingian' royal dynasty; the absorption by the Franks of large areas of central and northern Europe, from modern Holland to Saxony; the Europe-wide conquests of Charlemagne [Martel's grandson] ... these developments engulfed the Christian populations of much of continental Europe in a kingdom of truly 'imperial' dimensions, known to us as the Carolingian [or Frankish] empire. Regional 'micro-Christendoms' survived. But at the top of a victorious society, dominated by the Franks, their various representatives came together, for the very first time, to create what they considered to be the only true 'Christendom' that mattered."
[p. 378]

Martel and his Carolingian successors constantly expanded their theocratic empire by waging Holy War on all non-Christians, and even on those who weren't considered the right kind of Christian. Those against whom the Carolingians wielded the Sword of the Lord included the Islamic Emirate of Cordoba, the Pagans of Saxony and Frisia, and also the Lombards of Italy (who, while nominally Christian, were uncompromising enemies of the Pope and quite possible crypto-Pagans). Historian Kenneth Scott Latourette wrote the following (in his massive A History of the Expansion of Christianity) concerning the violent nature of the spread of Christianity under Charles Martel and the Carolingians, with special attention to the Heathens who resisted Christianization most stubbornly: the Saxons:

"As we have suggested, the conversion of the Saxons was achieved by a combination of armed force and the zeal of missionaries. So far as we know, never before had the adherence of any people to the Christian faith been brought about by quite so drastic a use of the mailed fist and with so much blood-letting among reluctant pagans. The completion of conversion of the entire Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries, accomplished though it had been under the urge of imperial legislation, had probably not entailed the killing of as many non-Christians as did the winning of this comparatively small area in North-western Germany [Saxony]. It was the first but not the last instance in which acceptance of baptism and of the Christian name was induced by a liberal application of the sword. We shall find the procedure repeated again and again in the thousand years between the eighth and the nineteenth century. We shall see it usually as part of the process of the conquest of one people by another -- invaders and conquerors employing the Church and its agents as one of their tools."
[pp. 104-105]

So, it is Charles Martel and the dynasty of marauding medieval theocratic warlords founded by him who truly embody the First Principle of the National Policy Institute: "a cultural compound of our Classical, Christian, and Germanic past". The court language of the Carolingians was the classical language of Latin, their religion was Christianity, and they themselves were Germanic.

But what about the other author of the National Policy Institute's "Statement of Principles"? That would be none other than Samuel T. Francis. Francis, who died in 2005, was also closely associate with another bunch of fascistic white-supremacists: The Council of Conservative Citizens. In fact, Francis was the author of the CCC's own "Statement of Principles", which contains fourteen principles. Principle Number One is:

"We believe that the United States of America is a Christian country, that its people are a Christian people, and that its government and public leaders at all levels must reflect Christian beliefs and values. We therefore oppose all efforts to deny or weaken the Christian heritage of the United States, including the unconstitutional prohibitions of prayers and other religious expression in schools and other public institutions."

Such are the "principles" of the National Policy Institute. Obviously, no self-respecting Heathen would be caught dead in such company!

But wait, there's more. In fact, once one gets started, it's hard to know where to stop in listing all the things we don't find out about the NPI in Brian Powell's 4000+ word article that promises to take us "inside the white nationalist movement".

We've already talked about Regnery and Francis. Here is some background information on two of the other featured speakers at the NPI conference attended by Powell as part of his "investigation":

James Edwards was not only a featured speaker at the NPI meeting on September 10, he was also one of three NPI representatives who held a press conference the previous day (at the National Press Club) to announce NPI's proposed "victory plan" for the Republican Party in 2012 based on the catchy slogan, "Win White America". The title of their plan is "The Majority Strategy", and the "majority" in question is actually what the NPI calls "America’s historic majority—namely, European Christians." Powell also doesn't tell us that Edwards once described (in 2007) infamous Klan leader David Duke as "a Christian man above reproach". Nor are we told that Edwards made that statement during his weekly radio show, which is broadcast from a Christian radio station, or that Edwards got his start in politics working for Catholic arch-conservative Pat Buchanan.

Peter Brimelow was another featured speaker at the National Policy Institute's September 10 meeting, and he also just happens to be the man behind the annually recurring evangelical rallying cry: "The War on Christmas". Brimelow has been beating the "War on Christmas" drum since the 1990's. In addition to coining the term in the first place, he has aggressively promoted his brainchild with a religious fervor that has managed to alienate even many conservatives. The National Review, for example, dropped out of the anti-"War on Christmas" campaign when its editorship passed from John O'Sullivan to Richard Lowry in 1997 (on Christmas Eve, as a matter of fact). But the FOX network, and Bill O'Reilly in particular, have been enthusiastic supporters of Brimelow's meme. Even before the "War on Christmas" campaign got underway, Brimelow wrote in his 1995 anti-immigration book, Alien Nation, that it is "nothing less than the plain truth" to describe the United States as a "Christian nation", and that this is "not in the least incompatible with a secular state." Brimelow also approvingly (and misleadingly) quoted from Thomas Paine to the effect that "we claim brotherhood with every European Christian." (After the successful conclusion of the Revolutionary War, Paine revealed what he had previously hidden from public view in the interests, as he saw it, of the Revolutionary cause: that not only was he himself no Christian, but that he held the lowest possible opinion of "this thing called Christianity".)

• "The Christian Question"

Clearly, then, when it comes to religion there can be no question of any hostility toward Christianity on the part of the National Policy Institute, and in fact they are if anything decidedly pro-Christian. It is nevertheless the case that one does find a surprising level of interest in a certain sort of "Paganism" (if it can really be called that, which is doubtful as we shall see) among some of the leading figures of the NPI. The true story of Paganism and the NPI is significantly more subtle and interesting than anything one might glean from Brian Powell's sophomoric hatchet-job.

Let's go back now to Samuel T. Francis, the "grand old man" of the NPI, whose attitudes toward Christianity and Paganism are quite a bit more nuanced, it turns out, than the impression one gets from either the blustering bible-thumping tone taken in the Council of Conservative Citizens' "Statement of Principles" (authored by Francis, see above), or from lurid intimations about "The Hammer of Thor" in Brian Powell's article. In fact, in the pages of the very first issue of The Occidental Quarterly, Samuel T. Francis expressed a qualified ambivalence toward modern Christianity while simultaneously expressing a somewhat wistful appreciation of (his own distorted idea of) "Paganism".

In TOQ volume 1, number 1 (Fall 2001), we find the article in question under the intriguing title "The Christian Question". This turns out to be a review by Francis of a 1996 book by James C. Russell: The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity: A Sociohistorical Approach to Religious Transformation. But before looking at what Francis had to say about Russell's book, lets look at Russell's own ideas about "the Germanization of Christianity".

James C. Russell was good enough to write a follow-up essay after the glowing review given to his book by Francis, and that essay appeared in the very next issue of TOQ: "The Western Contribution to World History" (here is a link to a pdf of the article). In that article, Russell celebrates the great achievements of the classical Greeks and Romans, while lamenting the fact that while they both, or so claims Russell, started out as culturally "homogeneous" they both fell into the error of "multiculturalism", thus leading to their declines and downfalls. After which the West languished until the eighth century when the Moors threatened to overrun Europe. It was now time for Europe to do or die. And this is precisely where Charles Martel and his Original Carolingian Gangstaz come in.

According to Russell, the Carolingian dynasty represented a newly "Germanized" Christianity that was now able to stand up for White Europe (aka "Christendom") and defend it against all enemies foreign and domestic. Here is how Russell puts it in his own words:

Early Christianity had found fertile ground for its message of individual salvation among the alienated, heterogeneous, urban inhabitants of the declining Roman Empire. Later, in the Early Middle Ages when Christian missionaries sought to convert the Germanic and Celtic peoples, it became apparent that for Christianity to be accepted by a more cohesive, homogeneous, pastoral-warrior society, it needed to appeal to the different concerns of that society. Hence, Early Medieval Christianity appealed to matters of group survival such as victory in battle, healthy families, and abundant crops and livestock. Germanic Christianity addressed these pre-Christian folk-religious concerns through local patron saints and clergy and their holy relics. In an apparent attempt to convert the Saxons who had been persecuted by Charlemagne, an adaptation of the New Testament known as the Heliand was composed in Old Saxon. It portrayed Christ and his apostles as a Germanic warrior-band. Eventually a Middle Eastern salvation religion was transformed into a European folk religion and Christianity became more closely identified with Europe, especially with the emergence of the notion of “Christendom.”

Early Medieval Christianity provided a spiritual impetus and a source of solidarity that are likely to have contributed toward European victories over invading forces. The bond between religious and temporal spheres increased under Charles Martel’s Carolingian descendants. They tended to view Christianity as the religion of a Roman Empire which they admired and sought to reconstruct. The application of religious fervor toward Western military exploits is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in a twelfth-century treatise of St. Bernard of Clairveaux entitled, In Praise of the New Knighthood. Written as an exhortation to the Knights Templar and other Crusaders, it distinguishes between fighting for “empty glory” or “earthly possessions” and fighting to assert Euro-Christian dominance in the Holy Land where Euro-Christian pilgrims and shrines had been attacked.

Recalling the existing medieval nexus between European self-identity and Christendom the following words of St. Bernard may be interpreted as a religious rationalization, if not an encouragement to assertively defend Western interests. Bernard writes:

The knights of Christ may safely fight the battles of their Lord, fearing neither sin if they smite the enemy, nor danger at their own death; since to inflict death or to die for Christ is no sin, but rather, an abundant claim to glory.... The knight of Christ, I say, may strike with confidence and die yet more confidently, for he serves Christ when he strikes, and serves himself when he falls.

There is nothing original in Russell's contention that Christianity became more violent as it became Europeanized (or "Germanized" as Russell would have it). This is right out of Kenneth Scott Latourette's A History of the Expansion of Christianity (referred to above), which was first published half a decade before Russell's book. However, it turns out that both Latourette and Russell were wrong in that they both characterized this as not just a change in outward behavior, but as a radical shift in the attitude of Christianity toward violence.

In stark contrast to the view of Latourette and Russell, contemporary (or nearly contemporary) sources that celebrate the hack-n-slashery of the Carolingians never give any indication that they considered the religiously inspired rampaging of Martel & Co. as something new under the sun. In fact, there simply was no change in the Christian attitude toward violence during the Middle Ages, for Christians had always not only accepted, but enthusiastically pursued violence, so long as that violence was in the name of Christ. What changed in the eighth century, rather, was the dramatic increase in the military and political means at Christianity's disposal, enabling Christians to more forcefully act out their (always present) violent tendencies. As Christianity became more powerful, due to the rise of an efficiently organized, militarily and financially well-endowed, and territorially ever expanding Christian state in the heart of Europe, Christianity became ever more violent in its actions in direct proportion to its increasing capacity to meet out violence. No attitude adjustment, or "Germanization" was necessary.

This point is addressed at some length by Lawrence G. Duggan in his paper "Compulsion and Conversion from Yahweh to Charlemagne", which appears as the third chapter in the 1997 scholarly anthology "Varieties of religious conversion in the Middle Ages" edited by James Muldoon (googlebooks link). In that paper, Duggan points out the contradiction between, on the one hand, Latourette's claim that the Carolingians were "the first but not the last" Christians to employ "a liberal application of the sword", and, on the other hand, Latourette's observation that "the methods employed in the conversion of the Saxons were so natural and logical an outgrowth of the policies of Charlemagne's predecessors that few [if any at all] seem to have been shocked." [The quotes are taken from pages 103 and 106 of the online version of Latourette here, which is volume II of "A History of the Expansion of Christianity", published in 1938 by Harper and Brothers.] In addition to Latourette, Duggan reviews several other eminent historians who have similarly failed to properly recognize that the "liberal application of the sword" in the name of the Lord during the Carolingian period was a continuation of the pattern of religious violence that can be seamlessly traced back at least three centuries prior to the birth of Martel, to the time when Gratian was the Roman Emperor, and Ambrose was the Bishop of Milan.

To drive home his point Duggan tells a story concerning King Ethelbert of Kent (560-616), who had allowed Christian missionaries to proselytize in his Kingdom, but who at first was personally disinclined to abandon Paganism, for he saw no reason to "forsake those beliefs which I and the whole English race have held so long." Eventually, though, Ethelbert was won over to the new religion, although he continued to allow his subjects the freedom to choose for themselves when and if they wished to convert, for he felt that "the service of Christ was voluntary and ought not to be compulsory." But when Pope Gregory was informed of Ethelbert's approach, he chastised the King, exhorting him to set aside his scruples and to "hasten to extend the Christian faith among the people who are subject to you. Increase your righteous zeal for their conversion; suppress the worship of idols; overthrow their buildings and shrines." The Holy Father further commanded the King to bring about the conversion of his English subjects "by exhorting them, terrifying, enticing, and correcting them."

I will have more to say (in Part Two Three) about the very obvious flaws in Russell's version of the history of Christianity, but now it is time to find out what Samuel T. Francis had to say about the supposed "Germanization of Christianity". In Francis' views, Russell had succeeded in proving the existence of three distinct stages in the historical process of Christianity's progress and eventual decline:

1. Originally, Christianity was otherworldly and multicultural, and it mainly appealed to the poor and the downtrodden.
2. Then Christianity became "Germanized", thus transforming it into a nationalist ideology that appealed to the elites, especially warriors and rulers.
3. But now in modern times Christianity has begun to degenerate back to the "slave mentality" (in Nietzschean phraseology) of it's multicultural roots.

In Francis' own words:

The early Christianity that the Germans encountered contained a good many universalist tendencies, adapted and reinforced by the disintegrating social fabric and deracinated peoples of the late empire. But thanks to Germanization, those elements were soon suppressed or muted and what we know as the historical Christianity of the medieval era offered a religion, ethic, and world-view that supported what we today know as “conservative values”—social hierarchy, loyalty to tribe and place (blood and soil), world-acceptance rather than world-rejection, and an ethic that values heroism and military sacrifice. In being “Germanized,” Christianity was essentially reinvented as the dynamic faith that animated European civilization for a thousand years and more.

The take-home lesson here is that it is no coincidence that William H. Regnery II, the Fuhrer behind both the National Policy Institute and the Occidental Quarterly, is the founder of the Charles Martel Society. And it is no coincidence that Regnery's mentor, Samuel T. Francis, was a great admirer of the historical period of Christianity when its naturally violent proclivities were given free rein. For people like Regnery and Francis, the only problem with Christianity today is that it is no longer as overtly and viciously intolerant and violent as it was back in the good old "Germanized" days.

continue to part two: Yet More on Pagans, Christians, and White Supremacists in the 21st Century

Undervaluing Non-Harming: On Brendan Myers on the Wiccan Rede

Hey boys and girls, it's that time of year again! That's right, it's Pagan Values Blogging Month!!

So, what should we discuss? I've got a suggestion: lets discuss noted Pagan philosopher and author Brendan Myers' criticisms of the Wiccan Rede.

Myers' critique is based on his contention that the ethical stance of the Wiccan Rede amounts to what he calls "utilitarianism". In my opinion, Myers is wrong both about what the Wiccan Rede actually means, and about the nature of genuine Utilitarianism.

In a follow-up post to come soon I'll say more about the true philosophical import of "an it harm none", but for now here is Myers in his own words from a discussion he initiated in March of 2010 at MysticWicks on "Alternatives to the Wiccan Rede" (March 4, 2010) (scroll down for more links):

As some of you may know, I'm not a big fan of the Wiccan Rede. I see it as too utilitarian: this is a problem because some questions of right and wrong have nothing to do with benefit and harm. I also see it as too 'negative': it tells us what we should not do, but does not offer positive alternatives. It's an ethic of freedom, which is obviously a good thing, but the Rede doesn't teach anything about what our freedom is for.

My own preferred alternative is a system of heroic honour and classical civic virtue. But this is perhaps not the only alternative.

Anyone else out there find themselves unsatisfied with the Wiccan Rede? What alternatives do you prefer?

Last edited by BrendanMyers; March 4th, 2010 at 09:38 PM.

Other relevant links (writings on ethics by Brendan Myers available online):

• "Replying to Critics of 'Thinking Shall Replace Killing'" (April 2011)
• Thinking Shall Replace Killing (Feb. 2011)
• A community statement on religious sexual abuse (Although this was a collective effort, both the original and final drafts were by Myers. May 2010)
• Ethics & Values in Druidry (from the website of the The Order of Bards Ovates & Druids, ~2009?)
• Selfless actions and Pagan ethics (2009)
• How Beautiful Are They— Some thoughts on Ethics in Celtic and European Mythology (The Ninth Mount Haemus Lecture of The Order of Bards Ovates & Druids, 2008)
• Wild Hunt interview (2008)
• Announcing The First Pagan Sovereign State! (humorous piece, published in Witches Voice 2005)

Other (more or less) related posts on Pagan Ethics (with a special emphasis on Socratic ethics) from this blog:

• Wicca and ancient philosophy (Plato, the Stoics, and the Wiccan Rede)
• Wicca and ancient philosophy, Part Two
• The varieties of sceptical thought (five part series)
• "Socrates of all mortals is wisest."
• The religion of Socrates
• "Those that are most stubborn and unbending She assails...." (on Plato's Republic, the Goddess Fortune, Pagan history, and related subjects)
• Paganism has always been a magical religion (on Eros and Ethics)
• Socrates: still making people crazy after all these years
• "an inescapable network of mutuality"
• Thomas Taylor on the religion of Socrates

"And a boat to the boatless" (Paganism, Christianity, and Charity)

Here are seven old posts from this blog on the subject of charity:

1. Pagans, Christians, and "Charity" (June 15, 2009)
2. On the Emperor Julian's supposed admiration and emulation of Christian "charity" (July 3, 2009)
3. "An inescapable network of mutuality" (July 8, 2009)
4. World Vision: Only Christians Need Apply (January 12, 2010)
5. Comparing World Vision and Hezbollah (January 14, 2010)
6. US Gov't Funding Cultural Genocide in Haiti (January 21, 2011)
7. "Travesty In Haiti": The truth about Christian missions, food aid, etc (January 25, 2011)

[Below is the first of these seven old posts, in its entirety, just to whet your appetite. The "boat to the boatless" quote, btw, can be found in the third post in the above list.]

Pagans, Christians, and "Charity"

Prudence Jones and Nigel Pennick state in their A History of Pagan Europe that Christians were the first human beings to ever "introduce" the world to "charity, the idea of the spiritual worth of the poor", and, not satisfied to leave it as an implication, they explicitly assert that the idea of charity was one "not shared by the many cults of the Pagan world." Jones and Pennick further assert that "Christianity was from the start a socially revolutionary movement." [p. 60]

It is crucial to understanding where Jones and Pennick are coming from, I think, to see clearly that they are not interested in simply giving Christians whatever credit they might deserve for their charitable works. They feel compelled to claim, falsely, that the idea of helping poor people was not only foreign and strange to ancient Paganism, it was something viewed with hostility and even actively resisted by Pagans because "Pagan society was deeply stratified and snobbish."

However, Geoffrey Rickman points out in his Roman Granaries and Store Buildings, that in distributing food to the needy "in fact, the Church had taken upon itself, although in a smaller way, the distributions and frumentationes of the [Pagan] Roman Empire." [p. 157 - emphasis added] Centralized distribution of food, an absolute pre-requisite for the existence of cities in the first place, had, at least in Rome, always included free distribution of food to the poor and tight regulation of food prices. O.F. Robinson in his Ancient Rome: City Planning and Administration goes so far as to state that food, "subsidized or free", along with amusements, were the true "opiate of the masses" in Pagan Rome. This is hardly an obscure bit of information known only to a few specialists, as anyone familiar with the origins of the phrase "bread and circuses" knows perfectly well.

Not only did Pagan Rome already have an extensive and systematic distribution system for providing food to the poor (and price subsidies for everyone else), centuries before Jesus came along, but this was done under the auspices of the Goddess Ceres. Interestingly, in addition to being the Goddess of Grain, Ceres is also sometimes (and not without justification) referred to as the Goddess of the Plebs, that is, the plebian class (which essentially included all Roman citizens who were not patricians). Some scholars have suggested that the frequency with which Ceres appears on coinage during the late Republic is evidence of attempts (by those in charge of issuing the coins) to garner the support of the plebs. The association of Ceres with the plebs probably goes back to the earliest days of the Roman Republic (for more on Ceres and the plebs see Barbette Stanley Spaeth's The Roman Goddess Ceres, especially the third section of the first chapter: The Early Republic, as well as the entire fourth chapter, which is devoted to The Plebs).

Elsewhere in this blog I have already discussed the strange notion of Christianity as a force for "social revolution" (here, here and here). Please see those posts for the gory details (and numerous references). The simple fact is, as everyone knows, that Christianity's "triumph" in the ancient world did not result in the springing up of egalitarian utopian societies - or even in modest, incremental improvements for slaves, the poor, women, or any other social group.

Jones and Pennick cite Robin Lane Fox's Introduction to his 1986 Pagans and Christians to support their statements about Christian charity (and the Pagan lack thereof). My 1987 Alfred Knopf hardback (American) edition of that book has a Preface, but no Introduction, and that Preface does mention Christian charity, but Fox's words do not in any way resemble those of Jones and Pennick. Fox also discusses charity later on, in his chapter on The Spread of Christianity (chapter 6). But as Fox points out in that chapter, where Christians had their "charity", Pagans had "philanthropy". And as far as "social revolution" goes this is what Fox has to say about the supposed idealism of Christianity concerning the less fortunate: "Christians did not always live up to it [surprise!], least of all in their attitude to the slaves whom they continued to own: if Christian women beat their maidservants to death, so an early council in Spain decided, they were to be punished with several years communion. The mild scale of punishment was hardly less revealing than the existence of such sinners." [p. 323] Fox also points out that Christianity inherited the practice of giving alms from "the synagogue communities", as well as inheriting the idealization of "abject poverty" from "its Jewish heritage". [p. 324]

Pagan Ethics According To Socrates: The Quick And Dirty Version

In his Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius wryly states of Socrates, "he was the first philosopher who discoursed on the conduct of life, and the first philosopher who was tried and put to death."

In other words: the teaching of ethics is a dangerous business and not for the faint of heart!

The core of Socrates' ethical teachings are contained in two of Plato's major works: the Republic and the somewhat less well known Gorgias. The presentation in the Republic is far more complete, and that work is therefore much longer.

Perhaps surprisingly, though, it is not that difficult to quickly summarize the main points of the Socratic ethics of Plato's Republic:

1. In the opening scene of the dialogue Socrates insists that (a) even as heat cannot produce cold, a good person can never cause harm, and (b) Justice is good, and, therefore, acting justly cannot cause harm.

2. Socrates also insists that it is always better to act justly than unjustly, even when there appears to be advantage in injustice and disadvantage in justice.

3. Glaucon (Plato's older brother), states that while these ideas are very appealing, Socrates has yet to prove that they are true. The remaining 90% of the Republic is concerned with taking up this challenge. As is typical of Socratic dialogues, no absolute conclusion is ever arrived at.* Despite the absence of definitive proof, however, Socrates and Glaucon remain convinced (in fact, more convinced than they were at the beginning) that (1) good people avoid causing harm, (2) Justice is always beneficial, and (3) no matter what the apparent consequences, it is always better to act justly, and one should never act unjustly.

4. At the end of the Republic Socrates recounts the famous "Myth of Er", according to which each of us receives a tenfold return for all of our just and unjust deeds. The "Myth of Er" also presents a very Pythagorean view of reincarnation (or, more precisely, metempsychosis) according to which spiritual progress is (at least potentially) made over the course of many lifetimes, and that in each incarnation we choose (within certain limitations over which we have no control) beforehand the life we are to have. Socrates uses Odysseus himself as the prime example of this: after the life recounted in Homer's Odyssey, Odysseus has learned to avoid all desire for fame and wealth, and chooses, wisely, in his next life to live as "a private man who had no cares."

5. One of Socrates' main concerns in the Republic is disputing the contention that acting in accordance with Justice is at odds with self-interest; that is, he argues against the idea that a person who acts justly will often suffer on that account and therefore be deprived of true happiness. According to Socrates there is no greater "self" concern than the proper care of the soul. Acting justly is always beneficial to the soul, and, therefore, is the only way to pursue genuine happiness. Conversely, acting unjustly is always harmful to the soul and can never lead to happiness.

* This lack of conclusiveness is in some ways even more pronounced in the Republic than in other dialogues. This is because early on Socrates proposes to talk, by analogy, about Justice as applied to the polis (that is, "the Republic" or "the State", or, more accurately, "the City"), rather than as applied to the individual. Socrates argues that in the State, Justice "is likely to be larger and more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them."

Origins of the concept of Cosmic Sympathy

[This is the second part in a series on Cosmic Sympathy.]

 Katerina Ierodiakonou provides a very handy overview of the ancient Greek philosophical concept of sympatheia, in her article The Greek Concept of Sympatheia and Its Byzantine Appropriation in Michael Psellos, which appears as the second chapter in the anthology The Occult Sciences in Byzantium, edited by Magdalino and Mavroudi (here is the book at googlebooks - most of this chapter can be viewed there):

A. In ancient Greek sympatheia has different, though obviously interrelated, meanings: it is used in medical writings, as for example in the Hippocratic corpus (De alim. 23.1), to refer to the fact that when a part of the human body somehow suffers another part may be affected, too; it is also used to talk about the fact that people may share the feelings of their fellow citizens, for instance in Aristotle's Politics (1340a13); finally, it is used to refer to the supposed phenomenon that all beings on earth and in the heavens are inextricably linked together. That is to say, the ancient notion of sympatheia indicates a close connection between things which are parts of some kind of a whole, either at the same level, as different parts of the body are in relation to the body as a whole, or at different levels, as the body and soul are in relation to the living being as a whole. Thus sympatheia could refer to the close connection between different parts of the same body as a whole, or the close connection between everything in the world as a part of the world as a whole, or between the body of the world and its soul as parts of the world.
[p. 99]

Note the three different uses of sumpatheia (and also note that Ierodiakonou states that these three uses are "obviously interrelated"): (1) in medicine to describe the relationship between different parts of the body, (2) to describe shared feelings among human beings, and (3) to describe the phenomenon by which everything in the universe is inextricably linked together. Ierodiakonou calls this last kind of sympatheia (which includes "the close connection ... between the body of the world and its soul as parts of the world") cosmic sympatheia, about which she says:

B. The notion of cosmic sympatheia was introduced by the Stoic philosophers in the Hellenistic period. Some scholars have attributed the full development of this notion to Posidonius at the end of the second and beginning of the first century BC [see especially K. Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie], but there is no doubt that even the early Stoics, and in particular Chrysippus, believed in a close affinity among the different parts of the universe; and for this close affinity they most probably used the term sympatheia, as well as the nouns synecheia or synochem symphyia, symmone, sympnoia, syntonia, and the corresponding verbs and adjectives. According to the Stoics there is nothing particularly mysterious about sympatheia, and especially about the relation between the things in the heavens and those on earth. In Stoic physics the whole cosmos is presented as a perfect living body whose parts, though, are imperfect, insofar as they are not self-sufficient and autonomous; for they cannot function by themselves and always depend on their being parts of this whole and its other parts. What holds the system together is a certain internal tension, a tonos, created in the universe by the so-called pneuma, which consists of a mixture of fire and air and permeates the entire world as its soul, sustaining everything. Thus the Stoics thought of the world as a unified living organism, a zoon: just as pneuma permeates a human body and makes it as its soul a living and organic whole, with each single part grown together in a close connection with all the rest, in the same way the whole world is permeated and given life by pneuma; this pneuma the Stoics identified with God who, in creating the world, becomes its soul.
[pp. 100-1]

Ierodiakonou has packed quite a lot into that paragraph! First she states the commonly held (and more or less correct) position that sumpatheia is a Stoic concept. And then she reports, without endorsing, the commonly held (and more or less misleading) position that the "full development" of sumpatheia is due to Posidonius, for which she cites the work of Karl Reinhardt. As Ierodiakonou correctly points out "there is no doubt that even the early Stoics, and in particular Chrysippus, believed in a close affinity among the different parts of the universe; and for this close affinity they most probably used the term sympatheia." Posidonius is routinely cited as the first clear cut case of a philosopher using the term sympatheia in the sense of "cosmic sympathy", but, as Ierodianokou strongly implies, this is almost certainly an artifact of the extremely fragmentary nature of the extant primary sources from earlier (prior to Posidonius) Stoics.

Here is what P.A. Meijer has to say in his Stoic Theology on the concept of sumpatheia and its origins, based on the writings of Cicero and Sextus:

C. There is an elaborate argument which develops the idea of the coherence of the universe, because there is everywhere the all encompassing power. It unites the things in this world and the natural events, which follow each other in an eternally repeating ordered motion.

We have this argument in Sextus and a limited version in Cicero. Scholars more or less agree that this argument is to be ascribed to Chrysippus [one of the early founders of Stoicism, predating Posidonius by about a century]. This most interesting argument is not only important as a typical piece of Stoic philosophy, but it has largely influenced later Greek philosophy, i.e. Neoplatonism, by its stressing the unity in this world. Unity as a consequence of the influence of the One was a favorite theme in Plotinus.
[pp. 85-6]

And here is part of the passage from Sextus (his Against the Physicists, I 78 ff.) that Meijer is referring to (see Meijer, or the original, for the complete passage):

D. Of bodies some are unified, some are formed of things conjoined, some of separate things. Unified bodies are such as are dominated by one structure, such as plants and animals. Those formed of conjoined parts are such as are composed of adjacent elements which tend to combine into one main structure, like cables, turrets and ships. Those formed of separate things are such as compounded of things which are disjoined and isolated and existing by themselves. like armies and flocks and choruses. Since the cosmos is also a body, it is either unified or of conjoined or of separate parts.

But it [the cosmos] is neither of conjoined nor of separate parts, as we proved from the sympathies it exhibits. For in accordance with the waxings and wanings of the moon many sea and land animals wane and was and ebb-tides and flood-tides occur in some parts of the sea. And in the same way, too, in accordance with certain risings and settings of the stars alterations in the surrounding atmosphere and all varieties of change in the air take place, sometimes for the better, sometimes fraught with pestilence. And from these facts it is obvious that the cosmos is a unified body. For in the cases of bodies formed from conjoined or separate elements the parts do not 'sympathize' with one another, since if all the soldiers, say, in an army have perished (save one), the one who survives is not seen to suffer at all through transmission; but in the case of unified bodies there exists a certain sympathy, since when the finger is cut, the whole body shares in its condition. So then, also the cosmos is a unified body.
[p. 86]

In his De Natura Deorum (II 19) Cicero speaks of "the harmony, unanimity, and unbroken affinity in nature" and then provides several examples of this, such as "the diverse courses of the stars [being] maintained in the single rotation of the entire heavens" and then he says "these processes could not take place through harmonious activity in all parts of the universe, unless they were each embraced by a single divine, all pervading, spiritual force [pneuma]".

Although it offers fewer details, Meijer is right in saying that Cicero's version is more "typically Stoic in that it describes the superior divine power as breath, pneuma. Pneuma is the Stoic element that causes structure in the inorganic, forms the psyche in animals and is also responsible for the mind in men. So it is the cause for the coherence of all things." Meijer also adds that this "concept of pneuma is characteristic of Chrysippus' thought." The point of this being that we needn't (and probably shouldn't) view cosmic sympathy as some later innovation by Posidonius, but rather as part of the foundational teachings of Stoicism qua Stoicism.

Returning now to Ierodiakonou (the passage labeled B above), she goes on to say that "there is nothing particularly mysterious about sympatheia, and especially about the relation between the things in the heavens and those on earth." Ierodiakonou doesn't tell us precisely (or even approximately) what she means by "mysterious", but later on (see passage E below) it will become evident that she is here imposing her own anachronistic (mis-) understanding of Stoic physicalism -- in particular she is conflating the very subtle ancient conception of physicalism (shared, in different forms, by the Stoics and Epicureans) with the much more narrow and crude modern conception of materialism. At the same time she is trying to draw a straight bright line between the supposed "dualism" of the Platonists and the physicalism of the Stoics, with the assumption that Stoic physicalism is not "mysterious" whereas Platonic "dualism" is.

After her cursory exorcising of all "mystery" from Stoic sumpatheia, Ierodiakonou goes on to write that "In Stoic physics the whole cosmos is presented as a perfect living body whose parts, though, are imperfect, insofar as they are not self-sufficient and autonomous." This is not only a correct statement about Stoic physics, it is also practically a direct quote from Plato's Timaeus. A little further down she acknowledges that the cosmological view that "the universe is a unified whole" in which "even parts of it which are separated by a large distance may affect each other in a conspicuous way" [see passage E below] is to be found in Plato's Timaeus. However, she fails to point out that Plato also wrote in the Timaeus that the universe as a whole is perfect and self-sufficient, while the parts of the universe are not. The Stoics are also in agreement with the Timaeus in that the universe as a whole is divine. In a word, Ierodiakonou, even while acknowledging some of the similarities, systematically exaggerates the differences between Platonic and Stoic cosmology.

Now here is one last passage from Ierodiakonou:

E. The Platonists were influenced by the Stoic notion of cosmic sympatheia to such an extent that it is only possible to fully grasp their use of the notion against its Stoic background. They also, following in this Plato's Timaeus, stressed the fact that the universe is a unified whole, and they also assumed that even parts of it which are separated by a large distance may affect each other in a conspicuous way, while the intervening parts seem unaffected. Plotinus, for instance, like Plato and the Stoics, thought of the world as living organism. Nevertheless, the Platonists' understanding of cosmic sympatheia significantly differs in certain respects from that of the Stoics. For their supreme God is transcendent and not part of the world, the way the Stoic God is immanent. In addition, on their view there is a sharp distinction between the material and immaterial world, of which the material world is a living image. Hence the Platonists strongly opposed the Stoics' doctrine of a direct commingling of the Divine with matter; they claimed that the Divine rather employs in the formation of the world certain incorporeal powers.
[p. 102]

First of all Ierodiakonou clearly overstates the Stoic "ownership" of the concept of sympatheia -- and she does so in a very bizarre way. Apparently forgetting that she has previously acknowledged that Plato's Timaeus already contained a similar concept to sympatheia, Ierodiakonou now claims that later Platonists must have been "influenced" by Stoic sympatheia. In fact, by the time of Posidonius the situation was increasingly just the opposite: Stoics were more and more being influenced by Platonism. A. A. Long has expressed the opinion that Posidonius marked a transition from "Platonizing Stoics", who appropriated Plato's words and ideas for their own (Stoic) purposes, to "Stoicizing Platonists", who, like Posidonius, significantly blurred any clear distinction between the two schools.

The details of Ierodiakonou's arguments are what makes it so bizarre. In his Timaeus, Plato presented a view of the cosmos in which everything is inextricably linked to everything else. Obviously Plato presented this idea in the context of a universe containing both physical and non-physical "stuff". The Stoics, however, took Plato's cosmological vision, and retooled it to fit into their purely "physical" universe. Therefore when later Platonists, from Plotinus to Proclus (etc) are found to have had a notion of cosmic sympathy of the sort found in the Timaeus (that is, in a cosmos comprised of things both physical and non-physical), this doesn't at all imply that these later Platonists have "modified" the Stoic, physicalist, notion of sympatheia -- it only means that they are consistently Platonic in their cosmology. Plotinus, et al, may certainly have borrowed and built upon some of the Stoic refinements to the conception of cosmic sympathy, but nothing more than that is at work.

To understand late antique Platonism it is necessary to study Stoicism. At the same time it is absolutely essential to study Plato in order to be able to have any grasp of Stoicism. Nowhere is this more true than when it comes to the theory of cosmic sympathy: it turns out that Stoicism and Platonism are inextricably intertwined with each other, like everything else in the cosmos.


Cosmic Sympathy:

1. "an inescapable network of mutuality"
2. Origins of the concept of Cosmic Sympathy
3. "the Milesian view that the whole world is alive"
4. Pythagoreanism: the personal is cosmological

"an inescapable network of mutuality"

Cosmic Sympathy, Cosmic Compassion
[This is the first part in a series on Cosmic Sympathy.]

I have not oppressed servants....
I have not defrauded the poor of their property.....
I have not caused harm to be done to a servant by his master.
I have not caused pain.
I have caused no man to hunger.
I have made no one weep.
I have not killed.
I have not given the order to kill.
I have not inflicted pain on anyone.....
I have not stolen milk from the mouths of children.....
I have given bread to the hungry man, and water to the thirsty man,
And clothes to the naked man, and a boat to the boatless.
[The Book of the Coming Forth By Day, aka "Egyptian Book of the Dead", Book 125]

When you see a hungry person, give him food. When you see someone sad, you are also sad.
[Zen Master Seung Sahn]

The English word "compassion" comes originally from the Latin compassio, which, in turn, was coined as a loan-translation (also known as a "calque") of the Greek philosophical term sumpatheia. Here is how one modern linguistics scholar explains the phenomenon of loan-translation (using compassio and sumpatheia as an example):

A calque (or loan-translation) is a very subtle way of borrowing a foreign word. Instead of taking over the foreign word bodily, the borrowing language translates it literally, piece by piece, thereby obtaining something that at least looks like a native word.

The ancient Romans often used this technique for deriving words from the then more prestigious Greek. For example, the Greek word sympathia consists of two pieces: a prefix syn- meaning 'with', and a stem pathia, meaning 'suffering'. The Romans translated this by using their own prefix con- 'with' and the Latin stem passio 'suffering', obtaining the latin calque compassio.
[R.L. Trask Language: The Basics p. 197]

Unfortunately the Greek word in question has at least three different spellings (using the English alphabet), and Robert Lawrence ("Larry") Trask (who really should have known better) here uses the variant that bears the least resemblance to the original Greek. I prefer to use sumpatheia and/or sympatheia.

Here is the first part of the entry for sympatheia in F.E. Peters' (invaluable) handbook Greek Philosophical Terms:

sympatheia: affected with, cosmic sympathy
1. The theory of cosmic sympathy, associated by modern scholars with the philosopher Poseidonius, rests upon a series of premises present in Greek philosophy almost from the beginning. The Milesians had seen the world as alive and the Pythagoreans as an ordered whole (see kosmos). And though Plato's interests had earlier lain in other directions, he devotes a full-scale treatment to the order and operation of the sensible world in the Timaeus, undoubtedly his single most widely studied work in the later tradition. Here he describes the kosmos as a visible living creature (zoon), having within it all things that are naturally akin (kata physin syngene; Tim. 30d)
[p. 186]

And here is the passage of the Timaeus cited by Peters above (using Cornford's translation found in his Plato's Cosmology, with some liberties):

For the Demiurge, wishing to make this world most nearly like that intelligible thing which is best and in every way complete, fashioned it [the kosmos] as a single visible living creature, containing within it all things that are naturally akin.

In his commentary on this section, Cornford says "Plato looks upon the whole visible universe as an animate living being whose parts are also animate beings." [p. 41] Cornford also warns against confusing Plato's Demiurge with any monotheistic conception of "God":

The temptation to read into Plato's words modern ideas that are in fact foreign to this thought has proved too much for some commentators .... The reader must be warned against importations of later theology .... There is, in the first place, no justification for the suggestion ... that Plato was a monotheist. He believed in the divinity of the world as a whole and of the heavenly bodies.
[pp. 34-5]

While Cornford is absolutely right in his insistence that the Demiurge should not be referred to as "God", in my opinion the alternative that he uses, "the god", is possibly even worse. Plato's beautiful Greek should not be translated into clunky English.

Cornford is also certainly wrong when he insists that "Neither in the Timaeus nor anywhere else is it suggested that the Demiurge should be an object of worship: he is not a religious figure." [p.35] Plato explicitly identifies the Demiurge as a God, and there is no suggestion anywhere in anything that Plato ever wrote that he believed that only certain Gods should be "objects of worship" but not others -- and this is what Cornford is claiming.

On the question of whether or not Plato intended the Demiurge to be an "object of worship" we also have important evidence from Xenophon's Memorabilia, in which Socrates declares unambiguously that

The more exalted the Gods are, while they deign to attend to you, the more ought you to honor them .... Do you not, then, believe that the Gods take thought for men? the Gods who, in the first place, have made man alone, of all animals, upright .... Do you not see, too, that to other animals they have so given the pleasures of sexual intercourse as to limit them to a certain season of the year, but that they allow them to us uninterruptedly till extreme old age? Nor did it satisfy the Gods to take care of the body merely, but, what is most important of all, they implanted in him the soul, his most excellent part.
[I.iv.12-18]

Xenophon tells us that Socrates used arguments like this against those who "neither sacrificed to the Gods, when engaged on any enterprise, nor attended to auguries, but ridiculed those who regarded such matters" [I.iv.2]. Xenophon revisits this subject in Book IV, chapter III of the Memorabilia, where he states that Socrates "endeavored to impress his associates with right feelings towards the Gods." As in Book I, Chapter IV (above) Socrates makes use of the argument that the Gods created us and the world around us and, therefore, they are worthy of our worship since they "exercise the greatest care for man in every way." After hearing such an argument, Euthymus declares that from henceforth, "I shall never fail, in the slightest degree, in respect for the divine power."

Both Socrates and his most famous student obviously believed that all Gods, as Gods, should be "objects of worship". Later Platonists removed any possible ambiguity by explicitly identifying the Demiurge with Zeus. But it cannot be too often repeated that there is absolutely no basis whatsoever for the claim that Plato ever conceived of two separate classes of Gods, only one of which were "objects of worship", while the others were "not religious figure[s]."

In subsequent posts on the subject of cosmic sympathy I'll take up the other points addressed by Peters' definition of sympatheia given above: (1) the attribution of the concept of sumpatheia to Posidonius, (2) the Milesian view that the whole world is alive, (3) the Pythagorean view of an orderly kosmos, and (4) the importance of Plato's cosmology (as presented in the Timaeus) for the next 900 years of Pagandom (which will also include a discussion of Proclus' commentary on the Timaeus).

And, there are also 7 (!) more parts to Peters definition of sympatheia, and I'll go through each of those as well.

But before ending this post let me address the following question: what does this "cosmic sympathy" have to do with our modern conception of "compassion"? I believe that Martin Luther King Jr. answered that question in his reply to critics who told him he had no business in Birmingham Alabama in the Spring of 1963:

I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states. I cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.
[Letter from a Birmingham Jail]

On the Emperor Julian's supposed admiration and emulation of Christian "charity"

In their anthology The Paganism Reader, editors Chas Clifton and Graham Harvey introduce the Emperor Julian's "Letter to a Priest" by claiming that it provides evidence for the contention that "Julian attempted to give Pagan religions an improved theological footing and a social conscience...." [p. 22]

Even Rowland Smith, a scholar with a far deeper understanding of Julian than Clifton and Harvey, feels compelled to state that in that same letter, Julian "showed himself ready to take a leaf from the Christian book" because of his exhortations concerning the practice of philanthropy [p. 111 of his Julian's Gods].

However, it is clear from what he actually wrote in that letter (as opposed to how others have chosen to characterize what he wrote), as well as from the known history of Pagan philanthropy itself, that Julian never believed, nor had he any reason to believe, that Paganism was lacking in any way in it's traditions with respect to philanthropy. Rather, Julian clearly believed, and rightly so, that philanthropy is an ancient Pagan virtue long predating Christianity, not something that Pagans had to "copy" from the Christians.

Julian states, among other things, that "we ought to share our money ... with the helpless and the poor so as to suffice for their need." And he also asserts that prisoners "have a right to the same sort" of philanthropy as the poor. In addition, hospitality should always be shown to strangers. Julian then quotes Homer: "from Zeus come all beggars and strangers."

Julian states that he is "wholly amazed" when he observes a Pagan who "sees his neighbors in need of money [but] does not give them so much as a drachma." This amazement is due to the fact that "from the beginning of the world", Zeus has been called "the God of Strangers", "the God of Comrades", and "the God of Kindred". Julian also emphasizes that "every man is akin to every other man", and that as important as differences "in habits and laws" are from one culture to another, nevertheless "the sacred tradition of the Gods", by which all humans are akin, is "higher and more precious and more authoritative" than the differences among human beings, for "we are all descended from the Gods."

At the end of this letter, Julian show just how little he admires or seeks to emulate the Galileans (or "take a page from their book"). For Julian compares the "charitable" Christians to

those who entice children with a cake, and by throwing it to them twice or three times induce them to follow them, and then, when they are far away from their friends cast them on board a ship and sell them as slaves, and that which for the moment seemed sweet, proves to be bitter for all the rest of their lives...

So just where exactly did the idea come from that Julian admired and sought to emulate the Christians because they had a "social conscience" which Pagans, up to then, had lacked?

In his "Invectives Against Julian" Gregory Nazianzen (330-390 AD) claimed that Julian's religious policies consisted largely of imitating "things that evidently belong to our constitution" and "things that he admired in our institutions. " Among the things that Gregory claimed as Christian inventions admired and imitated by Julian were charity, the establishment of places of meditation, relief work among prisoners, the building of inns and hospices for pilgrims, the establishment of "schools in every town, with pulpits and higher or lower rows of benches, for lectures and expositions of the heathen doctrines... ." and so forth. [First Invective, paragraphs 110-11]

A little later Gregory refers to Julian's supposed emulation of the Galileans as "this wonderful copying of theirs, or rather their parodying as it were on the stage." [para 113]

To get an idea of what kind of man this Gregory was, in those same Invectives he bitterly laments the fact that Julian was not murdered as a child, and Gregory maligns those who saved the life of the six year-old Julian when his father and brothers were being slaughtered, while praising the Christian Emperor Constantius (317-361), who ordered the slaughter (of members of his own family!) and whose only fault, in Gregory's eyes, was that he didn't go far enough! [First Invective, para 91] In fact, Gregory, even while praising Constantius as "the most celebrated of all the sovereigns" still feels compelled to criticize him for "mak[ing] a mistake highly unworthy of his hereditary piety" in allowing the child who would become Julian the Apostate to live. [para 3]

Gregory's mentality is further illustrated by the fact that he criticizes Julian for ... not killing Christians: "[H]e begrudged the honor of martyrdom, and for this reason he contrives now to use compulsion and yet not seem to do so."!! [para 58]

This is the man whose opinions modern day "Pagans", like Ronald Hutton and Chas Clifton, are aping when they claim that Julian was an admirer and imitator of the Galileans. Since "Pagans" like Hutton and Clifton have no qualms when it comes to questioning the validity of Julian's Paganism, why should anyone hesitate to question the validity of theirs?

Notes:
(1) The translations from Julian's "Letter to a Priest" are taken from the Loeb Classical Library's The Works of the Emperor Julian, Volume II, which can be downloaded in pdf format from googlebooks. Volume I is also available from googlebooks.
(2) The translations of Gregory's Invectives are taken from C.W. King's Julian the Emperor.
(3) The idea that Paganism found itself in need of a theological overhaul in order to be able to compete intellectually with the religion that gave us Jerry Fallwell is dealt with by an earlier post on Ancient Pagans and Theology: Did They or Didn't They?.
(4) More on philanthropic traditions among ancient Pagans can be found in another post: Pagans, Christians and Charity.
(5) Also see these three posts: Contra diZerega, Contra diZerega Part Deux, and Liberte, Egalite, Apoplexie, dealing with the general theme of whether or not ancient Pagans lacked a "social conscience".