Shine On You Crazy Diamond

Do not annoy the Religion of Peace. Or else. You have been warned.

And as a very practical matter, I just want him to understand that this stunt that he is talking about pulling could greatly endanger our young men and women who are in uniform .... Look, this is a recruitment bonanza for Al Qaida. You could have serious violence in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Barack Obama

We must not characterize Islam as inherently violent and intolerant, or do anything else that might antagonize Muslims. Why? Because if we do, they will hunt us down and kill us and generally run amok.

Say what again?

Of course, we have all heard, repeatedly: "Oh, it's only a tiny minority of Muslims who want to hunt us down and kill us and generally run amok!"

And: "The problem is not Islam, the problem is fundamentalism, and all religions have their fundamentalists!!"

One wonders, though: Where are the tiny minorities of Hindu, Sikkh, Buddhist, etc, "fundamentalists" that are out to kill us if we insult or otherwise antagonize them?

When was the last time you heard someone insist, "Don't say anything bad about the Dalai Lama. If you do, you will be putting American lives at risk! I mean, sure, he's a peacenik -- but a tiny minority of his followers are vicious psychopaths!"???

In Livermore, California, residents have been complaining about the big Hindu temple there (the Shiva-Vishnu Temple). "Many times their festivities are two to three days long, 24 hours a day. We ask them not to wake up the neighbors, but they basically say it's their religious right," one resident told the local press. The city planning commission has worked with residents and Temple officials to try to "make some accommodations", but plans to further expand the already 25 year old Temple are moving forward. So far, no one has thought to raise concerns about retaliation by Hindu fanatics because of the protests.

In 2008, residents of Richfield Ohio (just outside Cleveland) fought against a proposal to build a Hindu Temple there. There were even accusations that the “Concerned Richfield Homeowners” were, at least in part, motivated by bigotry, although they claimed to only be concerned about "traffic and noise and the influx of strangers into the residential neighborhood." But, once again, there were no dire warnings about the dangers of aggravating the dreaded Hindutva terrorists.

Just this April, the Hindu Temple of Georgia auctioned off the last of its sacred statues of Hindu deities. The Temple went into bankruptcy last October, and the building itself was sold to a new owner in December. The Temple has recently been dogged with controversy. The IRS is investigating them. Accusations have been made about inappropriate personal use of Temple funds. The head Priest of the Temple was even arrested last year for credit car theft and unlicensed practice of medicine, although all charges were later dropped. So far, however, there has been no indication that International Hindu Jihadist groups have taken any interest.

When a Hindu layperson led the opening prayer for the US Senate session on July 12, 2007, an organized group of Christians in the gallery tried to shout him down and had to be arrested and taken away, causing a significant disruption. There was, understandably, outrage at this, both in the US and in India (and around the world, as well). Did it occur to anyone, though, that this very high profile outburst of anti-Hindu bigotry could incite a tiny minority of bloodthirsty crazies to commit acts of violence against the tens of thousands of Americans living in India? Uh, no.

And let's not forget about the (1B+) Catholics. Kathy Griffin gets big laughs (well, from me, anyway) every time she refers to Catholic priests as "kid fuckers" in her stand-up routine. And then I laugh even harder when she tells us how her devout mother responds: "not all of 'em!" Meanwhile Sam Harris and Richard Dawkins continue their international campaign to have the pope arrested during his visit to the UK (coming up on September 18th), and outspoken Protestant leader Ian Paisley has called for the trip to be cancelled altogether. Now everyone knows the Papists are bad-asses. Think: the Albigensian Crusade, the Northern Crusades, the Inquisition, the Castel Sant'Angelo, Generalissimo Francisco Franco, and so forth. But does anyone expect to see youtube videos of a hollow-eyed, ashen-faced Kathy Griffin with AK-47's pointed at her head and a knife at her throat while she holds up a newspaper and begs for her life?

I'm just sayin'.

Rick "the frothy mixture of lube and fecal matter that is sometimes the byproduct of anal sex" Santorum

Who let the flying monkeys out?
(screech, screech, scree-screech)
Who let the flying monkeys out?
(screech, screech, scree-screech)

If this doesn't make sense to you, and you want to learn more, please see Stephanie Mencimer's piece at Mother Jones: Rick Santorum's Anal Sex Problem. (If the Mother Jones link doesn't work for any reason, here is link to the same article at the Huffington Post.)

"I've sort of been in denial about the fact that Rick Santorum is going to run for president," Savage says. "But now I'm going to have to sic my flying monkeys on him."

Pagan Cosmology: not quite random thoughts on Platonism, polytheism, monism, and so forth

Toward the beginning of Plato's famous treatise on Pagan Cosmology, Socrates says to his friend Timaeus (after whom this dialogue is named):

Socrates: Bounteous and magnificent, methinks, is the feast of speech with which I am to be requited. So then, it will be your task, it seems, to speak next, when you have duly invoked the Gods.

[27b]

To which Timaeus responds:

Timaeus: Nay, as to that, Socrates, all men who possess even a small share of good sense call upon God always at the outset of every undertaking, be it small or great; we therefore who are purposing to deliver a discourse concerning the Universe, how it was created or haply is uncreate, must needs invoke the Gods and Goddesses (if so be that we are not utterly demented), praying that all we say may be approved by them in the first place, and secondly by ourselves. Grant, then, that we have thus duly invoked the deities.

[27c]

Here is the original Greek:

Σωκράτης
τελέως τε καὶ λαμπρῶς ἔοικα ἀνταπολήψεσθαι τὴν τῶν λόγων ἑστίασιν. σὸν οὖν ἔργον λέγειν ἄν, ὦ Τίμαιε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη καλέσαντα κατὰ νόμον θεούς.

Τίμαιος
ἀλλ᾽, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε δὴ πάντες ὅσοι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν, ἐπὶ παντὸς ὁρμῇ καὶ σμικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου πράγματος θεὸν ἀεί που καλοῦσιν: ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λόγους ποιεῖσθαί πῃ μέλλοντας, ᾗ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ παντάπασι παραλλάττομεν, ἀνάγκη θεούς τε καὶ θεὰς ἐπικαλουμένους εὔχεσθαι πάντα κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις μὲν μάλιστα, ἑπομένως δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ θεῶν ταύτῃ παρακεκλήσθω.

Socrates refers to θεούς ("theous"), the plural, masculine accusative of θεός ("theos"), "God". In his direct reply, Timaeus refers to θεὸν ("theon") (singular masculine accusative), θεούς ("theous") (pl masc acc), θεὰς ("theas") (pl fem acc), and then again to θεῶν ("theon") (sg, masc, acc). In other words these two fifth century BC Pagans make no (or vanishingly little) distinction between:

1. God (theos)
2. Gods (theoi)
3. Gods and Goddesse (theoi, theai)

And this is not just some random passage from just any old bit of classical Greek literature. This is from the pious invocation, at the urging of Socrates himself, leading into the most complete and definitive statement of classical Pagan theology.

Some hint at the importance of the Timaeus is indicated by the fact that almost eight centuries after it was written it served Julian as the model for the Pagan world-view which he contrasted, in his Contra Galileos, with the pathetically incoherent Christian attempts at cosmologically exegesizing the Jewish scriptures. And more than a century after Julian, Timaean cosmology was central to the philosophy of Proclus and the other Pagan diehards at the last remaining openly functioning Pagan institution of the ancient world: Plato's Academy in Athens.

It is crucial to realize that the Timaeus also formed the basis for the cosmology of the Stoics (in addition to that of Platonists), and, moreover, that this cosmology was largely derived in the first place from Pythogreanism. This clearly indicates that the Timaeus is not some sectarian exposition narrowly representing one school of thought, but a masterful summation of a broadly inclusive Pagan cosmology.

Returning to the specific passage quoted above: What is the significance of the way in which Socrates and his young friend appear unconcerned with drawing bright lines between singular, plural, masculine and feminine references to the divine -- distinctions that loom large in the small minds of those deemed by Julian "the creed making fishermen"??

A partial answer to that question was given by Gilbert Murray back in 1912, when he wrote the following, concerning the religious views of ancient Greek philosophers:

Indeed a metaphysician might hold that their theology [that of the Pagan Greeks] is far deeper than that to which we are accustomed, since they seem not to make any particular difference between hoi theoi and ho theos or to theion. They do not instinctively suppose that the human distinctions between "he" and "it", or between "one" and "many", apply to the divine.
[Four Stages of Greek Religion, Gilbert Murray, 1912, p. 90. Or p. 67 of Five Stages of Greek Religion, first published in 1935.]

Unfortunately, Murray still manages to mangle things badly by insisting on embedding this observation in a stupid attempt to argue that the ancient Greeks, or at least the intelligent and philosophically inclined ones, were actually monotheists, or "near to monotheism", after all. That, of course, flies directly in the face of the fact that Murray himself has acknowledged: namely, that the ancient Greeks understood the falseness of the dichotomy that pits "the one" against "the many" -- and monotheism is rendered meaningless unless it means reverence for one and only one God, which, in turn, requires the explicit rejection and denigration of all other Gods -- or even a denial of their existence as Gods.

In his essay Monotheism and Polytheism (written nearly a century after Gilbert Murray's quote above), Egyptologist Jan Assmann sheds some light on this matter, as follows (emphases in bold have been added):

What is polytheism?

"Monotheism" and "polytheism" are recent words, not older than the 17th century CE, and they have different statuses. Monotheism is a general term for religions that confess to and worship only one God. "One God!" (Heis Theos) or "No other gods!" (first commandment) -- these are the central mottos of monotheism. The religions subsumed under the term polytheism cannot, however, be reduced to a single motto of opposite meaning, such as "Many gods!" or "No exclusion of other gods!" On the contrary, the unity of oneness of the divine is an important topic in Egyptian, Babylonian, Indian, Greek and other polytheistic traditions. Polytheism is simply a less polemical substitute fo what monotheistic traditions formerly called "idolatry" and "paganism" (Hebrew aboda zara, Arabic shirk or jahilila). Whereas monotheism consitutes a self-description of religions subsumed under that term, no such self-description exists for polytheistic religions. Monotheism asserts its identity by opposing itself to polytheism, whereas no polytheistic religion ever asserted itself in contradistinction to monotheism, for the simple reason that polytheism is always the older or "primary" and monotheism the newer or "secondary" type of religion. Monotheism is a self-description, polytheism is a construction of the other. However, although polytheistic religions include a concept of divine unity, these religions undoubtedly do worship a plethora of gods, which justifies applying a word built on the element poly (many) to them. Unity in this case does not mean the exclusive worship of one god, but the structure and coherence of the divine world, which is not just an accumulation of deities, but a structured whole, a pantheon.
[Religions of the Ancient World, ed. Sarah Iles Johnston, 2004, p. 17]

To be continued ....

99 Lashes

Sakineh Mohammad Ashtiani, a 43 year old Iranian woman, was originally sentenced to be stoned to death for the crime of adultery. After an international outcry her case was "reviewed".

According to her son, Sakineh was informed last Saturday, August 28, that she would be hanged at dawn the following morning, but the sentence was not carried out.

Now reports are circulating that Sakineh will be subjected to 99 lashes, or even that this has already happened (AP, UPI, Daily Mail, The Australian, BBC). Incredibly, this sentence is in addition to the death sentence still hanging over her head, and in addition to 99 lashes that she has already received!

It should be remembered that the Islamic Republic of Iran came into existence in 1979 as the result of a massive popular uprising. The central figure of that uprising was the Ayatollah Khomeini who made no secret of his extreme, fundamentalist views.

Khomeini published a book in 1970 titled Velayat-e faqih (Persian: ولایت فقیه, velāyat-e faqīh), which translates as "Government of the Just". It was a blueprint for an Islamic "Republic" in which adherence to Sharia is guaranteed by Islamic "jurists" (faqih, plural fuqaha). The form of government now in place in Iran, in which all matters of government and law are subject to approval by the Guardian Council composed of fuqaha is a straightforward implementation of Khomeini's ideas (see Article Four of the Iranian Constitution, and also other relevant portions of the Constitution dealing with The Leader and the Guardian Council).

Even before writing Velayat-e faqih Khomeini was already one of the most well known and revered Shia clerics in the world. When Iranians rose up by the millions in 1978-79, they knew who Khomeini was and what his ideas were. The Iranian revolution is all the evidence we need (although it is hardly all we have) that the so-called "extremists" have never been, and are not now, a tiny isolated minority, but rather enjoy widespread, active, informed and enthusiastic support among a very significant portion of Muslims throughout the world.

The Socratic Logos in Plato's Republic

Plato's Republic is possibly the most famous book in the history of Western culture, and is likely the most influential work of philosophy ever.

Twenty four centuries after its composition, there is no agreement on even the broad outlines of the structure of Plato's Republic, let alone the underlying meaning that Plato intended to communicate to the reader. As Aleister Crowley once quipped, "theorists have not been at a loss to explain, but they differ." And even that is putting it very mildly. Karl Popper considered it a Fascist manifesto, while Robin Waterfield has claimed that it presaged the ethical teachings of Christianity. Both scholars got things very wrong, though, and ended up complementing Hitler and Jesus in a way that neither deserved, by attributing to them a Platonism that neither possessed.

The Republic tells the story of a pleasant day on the outskirts of Athens, about twenty-four hundred years ago and change, spent by Socrates and some friends discussing the question: What is Justice? The major sticking point in their investigation turns out to be the question of whether or not "to be just is always better than to be unjust?" To put it another way: doesn't self-interest, at least sometimes, dictate that it is better to act unjustly, so long as one can get away with it?

To help frame the discussion, Glaucon (Plato's brother and one of the main discussants in the Republic) poses to Socrates (at the opening of Book II) the following three questions:

(1) "Is there not one class of things which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although nothing follows from them?"

(2) "And is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?"

(3) "And is there not a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of money-making -- these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or result which flows from them?"

Socrates readily assents to this threefold classification, but asks Glaucon what his point is. And then Glaucon asks Socrates to which of the three classes Justice belongs. Socrates responds that it belongs to the second class (which Socrates calls καλλίστῳ, kallisto, "the fairest"), because Justice is something that is desirable both for its own sake and for the sake of its results.

Glaucon then observes that, nevertheless, "the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in the troublesome class [the third class above], among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be avoided."

Socrates agrees that, yes, obviously, this is the way that Justice is viewed by most. But then Glaucon pleads with Socrates to convince him of the rightness of the view that Justice is good both in itself and because of its results -- because this is what Glaucon feels should be the case. For, while Glaucon wants to believe that Justice is always better than injustice, he also finds it impossible to definitively answer the cynical arguments of "the many" who hold that "the life of the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just", because (again, in the view of "the many") it is a troublesome burden to have to act justly, and the truly free man will always act according to his own desires and best interests, which are often at odds with Justice.

Having laid the groundwork and set the scene, Plato places into Glaucon's mouth the basis on which the inquiry concerning Justice and injustice will now proceed: "I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul."[358b] In order to further this end, Glaucon declares that he will defend "to the utmost of my power" what he and Socrates have agreed is the "common view" of Justice and injustice, namely that "all men who practise justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a good."

It is important to emphasize that Glaucon is not at all playing devil's advocate. Rather he is genuinely giving voice to his own innermost doubts. In doing so he demonstrates the most distinctive and necessary virtue of a student of philosophy, which is the opposite of self-deception: ruthless self-honesty. Glaucon wishes he did not have these doubts, but he realizes that so long as these doubts remain unanswered, they will prevent him from consistently acting in accordance with what he believes to be true, but of which he is not genuinely convinced.

The Republic, therefore, turns out to be (in addition to the many other things that it is) an extended exercise in applied Socratic epistemology. That is to say, Glaucon already possesses "true belief" (ἀληθῆ δόξαν), but he lacks a corresponding "account" (λόγος), that is, an explanation of why this belief is true. These terms are found in Plato's dialogue on epistemology, the Theaetetus, where one of the proposed definitions for knowledge is meta logou alêthê doxan ("true belief combined with logos"). It is precisely this logos that Glaucon is lacking and that he urgently seeks from Socrates. The only way Glaucon can accomplish this is by calling up from his own psyche every objection and doubt that he can find there.

It is, in fact, somewhat controversial whether or not the formula meta logou alêthê doxan can be taken as "Plato's theory of knowledge." The Theaetetus is an aporetic dialogue, that is to say, every proposed answer to the question "what is knowledge?", including "true belief combined with logos", is rejected by Socrates (and, as usually happens, Socrates also convinces his fellow investigators on that day to reject each proposed answer as well).

My own opinion on this matter is in many ways close to that of Rosemay Desjardins, who has argued that Plato's distrust of words, and of the written word in particular, led him to insist on demonstrating that even statements that, if interpreted properly, convey Plato's own understanding of basic philosophical principles, are still quite vulnerable to misinterpretations which lead to philosophical conclusions that are demonstrably false.

In her essay, Why Dialogues? Plato's Serious Play, Desjardins quotes from Plato's Charmides, where Socrates himself says that he feels the need "to investigate the meaning of my own words -- from a fear of carelessly supposing at any moment that I knew something while I knew it not." [166c8-d2] Desjardins then elaborates on this point as follows:

This is why characteristic Platonic doctrines are themselves subjected to cross-examination and under certain circumstances suffer elenchus. Thus, Meno's understanding of the Platonic claim that virtue is knowledge is shown to be indefensible, Theaetetus' understanding of the Platonic doctrine that knowledge involves true opinion and logos is shown to be inadequate, and young Socrates' understanding of the doctrine of forms is shown to be fragile under cross examination by Parmenides.
[Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings, ed. by Charles Griswold, p. 115]

In the specific case of the "Platonic doctrine that knowledge involves true opinion and logos", Desjardin has also produced a full, book length study (The Rational Enterprise: Logos in Plato's Theaetetus) devoted to demonstrating that this is, indeed, a "Platonic doctrine", despite the fact that the dialogue ends with Socrates and everyone else scratching their heads and claiming to have not discovered an answer to question what is knowledge?

In my opinion, though, what Plato manages to do in the Republic, is to present a much more forceful "account" than that which is found in the Theaetetus, of why this logos is so crucial to genuine knowledge: a logos of logos itself, if you will. This two-fold logos is nothing less than the missing link that resolves the so-called Socratic paradox, for it explains how one can wish to act rightly and still fail -- while also indicating the way out of the paradox. If one has only the alêthê doxan (true belief) about Justice, but without the logos, then one will be faced with the miserable prospect of believing in Justice, but being incapable of acting Justly. This is precisely the situation that Glaucon finds himself in at the opening of Book II, and it is in order to extricate himself from this situation that he seeks assistance, in the form of logos, from Socrates. This shows that the so-called "Socratic paradox" is only paradoxical when true belief, alone (without logos) is mistaken for true knowledge.

One of the more common statements of the paradox is "no one does wrong willingly (or knowingly)." A somewhat longer statement of the paradox is found in Xenophon's Memorabilia, iii.9.5:

Socrates said that justice, moreover, and all other virtue is wisdom. That is to say, things just, and all things else that are done with virtue, are "beautiful and good"; and neither will those who know these things deliberately choose aught else in their stead, nor will he who lacks the special knowledge of them be able to do them, but even if he makes the attempt he will miss the mark and fail. So the wise alone can perform the things which are "beautiful and good"; they that are unwise cannot, but even if they try they fail. Therefore, since all things just, and generally all things "beautiful and good," are wrought with virtue, it is clear that justice and all other virtue is wisdom.

Sometimes one encounters reference to multiple Socratic paradoxes: (1) no one does wrong willingly, (2) virtue is knowledge, and (3) the virtues are one. A little reflection (especially if one reads Xenophon's words above) shows that these are all restatements of a single principle. Each way of stating the principle has some merit on its own, but they do not constitute separate principles (or paradoxes).

We cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that only "those who know these things", that is, those that know "things just, and all things else that are done with virtue", they alone are able to choose to act justly, wisely, well, and virtuously (which all amount to the same thing), and not only will they be able to so choose, but they do so choose. Since virtue is wisdom, the fact that the wise act Justly is no longer a a paradox as much as it is a tautology. On the other hand, those who are ignorant of this "special knowledge" cannot act Justly, and "even if they try they fail."

[The pic of the relief of Bendis with torch race victors is from Phil Harland's website here.
The pic of the statue of Artemis Bendis is from wikipedia here.
The map of Athens showing the Pireaus is from Karl Galinsky's online resources for his Intro to Ancient Greece class at U Texas here.]

Buddhism Without Ironic Detachment

"Ironic detachment is a stratagem
for concealing one's feelings."
[Cool Rules: Anatomy of an Attitude
by DICK POUNTAIN and DAVID ROBINS]

1. "... but in a way that corresponded with my own interests and needs."

As a young man, Stephen Batchelor traveled half-way across the world in order to study Tibetan Buddhism. Even once he accomplished the long and difficult journey from the British Isles to Dharamsala, India, Batchelor was at first turned away when he asked to be accepted for monastic ordination. Only after a full year of further reflection did Batchelor ask again, and this time he was approved to be ordained as a monk in the Gelugpa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism (on June 6, 1974).

Just three months after his ordination, however, Batchelor attended a retreat led by S.N. Goenka, at which Goenka taught his own version of vipassana, a form of meditation practice associated with Theravada Buddhism. Suddenly Batchelor decided that what he really wanted to study and practice was not Tibetan Buddhism at all, but rather "Goenka-style vipassana".

There was a falling out of some sort, though, so Batchelor did not actually become a student of Goenka's. Nevertheless, Batchelor claims to have "studied" with Goenka, when in fact that one retreat, followed by what Batchelor has described as "a certain conflict with Goenka", was the sum total of his training in "Goenka-style vipassana,"

Instead, Batchelor continued to be a Gelugpa monk, and pretended to be studying and practicing Tibetan Buddhism, even though he now believed that "Goenka-style vipassana" was "certainly ... more immediately effective" than anything found in Tibetan Buddhism. [see interview linked to above and below]

Many years later, Batchelor was asked: "Was there any conflict or difficulty around mixing the practices?"

Batchelor replied that there was some conflict, but this was only due to the fact that, in his words, "this practice ["Goenka-style vipassana"] was not really understood by the Tibetans." This is a very revealing statement. After three full months of formal training in Tibetan Buddhism Batchelor now felt qualified to condescendingly dismiss the "understanding" of the Lamas who had, reluctantly, agreed to take him in as a student.

Batchelor did consider possibly switching to another school of Tibetan Buddhism, but when he learned that they would also expect him to actually study and practice Tibetan Buddhism (what a concept!), he "quickly lost interest." [Confessions of a Buddhist Atheist, p. 61]

By 1979 (Tibetan Buddhists are very patient people) Batchelor's welcome appears to have been wearing rather thin. From a friend, he learned of a Zen monastery in Korea that accepted western students, and obtained (from the same friend) an English translation of Dharma talks by the head of the monastery, which Batchelor says he found to be "largely incomprehensible." With no more information than this, Batchelor wrote to the monastery, and as soon as he learned that they would accept him he took his "formal leave" of his teacher and in his own words "severed my links with the world of Tibetan Buddhism in which I had spent most of my adult life." [Confessions, pp. 61-62] My guess is that they helped him pack and gave him a ride to the airport.

Of his new teacher in Korea, Batchelor says that from the beginning, "I maintained an ironic but respectful distance ... I put Kusan Sunim's instructions into practice, but in a way that corresponded with my own interests and needs." [p. 66]

Batchelor was unpleasantly surprised to learn that, like his former teacher (Geshe Rabten), Kusan Sunim also naively believed in the "validity" of what he taught. To this day, Batchelor is scratching his head over the puzzling fact that both of these stupid backwards Asiatic simpletons were "committed to upholding and transmitting what they had been taught by their teachers and lineage." [p. 66] Oh, the inscrutable mysteries of le pensee sauvage!

In December of 1983 Kusan Sunim died. Batchelor spent the next year helping to prepare an English language edition of Sunim's teachings, and then, one year after the Master's death, he left Korea and returned to England and to lay life.

Back in England, Batchelor eventually came to be viewed (for some reason) as a Buddhist teacher and even something of a Buddhist philosopher. Certainly he viewed himself as not only both of these, but as nothing less than the prophet of a New Buddhist Dispensation.

However, Batchelor did not at first reveal the extent of his inflated self-image. Once again, ironic detachment served him well as he cautiously struck a pose as just another ex-hippie pseudo-intellectual searching for a form of spiritual practice that would blend comfortably with the blandly middle-class mindset and lifestyle that he had safely returned to after running out of wild oats to sew abroad.

To be continued .....

[The pic of the two girls at the top of the post is a promo for the film "Eve and the Firehorse" by Julia Kwan -- the pic was found here.
Little Buddha at the computer pic was found at Elephantjournal.
Ironman Zen pic is by Freakscity.]

"most Americans do not buy the 19 fanatics story"

The Greek word "phobos" (φόβος) is found in Homer, where it means "flight". In fact, Phobos was a Demi-god, one of Ares' attendants, the others being Deimos (terror) and Eris (strife). According to Hesiod, Phobos and Deimos were also sons of Ares by his wife Aphrodite, while Eris was one of the parthenogenic daughters of Nyx, Goddess of the Night.

In modern English usage, "phobia", derived from "phobos", has come to mean "irrational fear". In fact, a phobia is taken to be a psychological malady involving a fear that is not merely excessive, but that interferes significantly with leading a normal, productive life.

Thus the term "Islamophobia" has come to be used like a magic wand to make all reasonable criticism of Islam disappear into a fog of politically-correct psychobabble. Poof. According to the exculpatory apologetics of the multiculturalists, all negative opinions about the Religion of Peace originate only in the mental illness of Islamophobia. This is true even when criticisms of Islam are based on the explicit teachings of the Quran, the traditional biographies of Muhammed, the literature of the Hadith, the documented history of Islam, and the incontrovertible facts on the ground in all modern societies dominated by Islam.

The hysterical, baseless accusation of "Islamophobia" provides the backdrop to Judea Pearl's fascinating piece that appeared on Saturday in the Jerusalem Post (link here, and the full text is below) in which he looks closely at the "intense controversy" in America concerning the proposal to build a lavish $100M mosque-cum-"culture center" at Ground Zero.

A little over two weeks ago it looked like this controversy might die out. But President Obama chose the beginning of Ramadan to enter the fray with a clumsy, nearly substance-free declaration, followed by even more vapid "clarifications" that only further stoked the flames. And now that September 11 is less than two weeks away, there is no possibility of this "intense controversy" becoming anything other than even more intense.

Dr. Pearl -- a world renowned mathematician and philosopher in his own right who is, tragically, more well known as the father of murdered journalist Daniel Pearl -- asks the question: why? Why does this issue have such resonance? Why, in the age of the 24-hour news-cycle, do we seem to be incapable of "getting past" this story?

It's a good question, and Pearl offers some very important insights, and, in the process, does an admirable job of undermining the "Islamophobia" meme. Personally I do think he is far too quick to assert that "Americans are neither bigots nor gullible," for Americans have demonstrated that we certainly have the capacity to be both. Americans were gullible about Saddam Hussein's non-existent "Weapons of Mass Destruction". And a significant portion of the American electorate voted against Barack Obama because he is Black.

But more Americans voted for Obama than against him, and even most of those who voted against him did not do so because of racism. And many Americans never believed the lies about WMD, and even participated in large numbers in massive demonstrations against the invasion of Iraq. (The fact that this anti-war movement fizzled once the war started is a reflection of an understandable, although in this case misguided, reluctance to openly oppose a war once American troops are fighting and dying.)

And so even though we are, in fact, innocent of neither racism nor gullibility, these are not rigidly deterministic factors that by themselves ineluctably lead to any such thing as "Islamophobia". More importantly, Judea Pearl correctly identifies the key factor that accounts for the fact that nearly 3/4 of all Americans now oppose the Ground Zero Mosque: not an irrational fear, but a very reasonable distrust of Islam.

Undercurrents below the Ground Zero mosque
By JUDEA PEARL 08/28/2010 Jerusalem Post (direct link to article here)

I have been trying hard to find an explanation for the intense controversy surrounding the Cordoba Initiative, whereby 71 percent of Americans object to the proposed project of building a mosque next to Ground Zero.

I cannot agree with the theory that such broad resistance represents Islamophobic sentiments, nor that it is a product of a “rightwing” smear campaign against one imam or another.

Americans are neither bigots nor gullible.

Deep sensitivity to the families of 9/11 victims was cited as yet another explanation, but this too does not answer the core question.

If one accepts that the 19 fanatics who flew planes into the Twin Towers were merely self-proclaimed Muslims who, by their very act, proved themselves incapable of acting in the name of “true Islam,” then building a mosque at Ground Zero should evoke no emotion whatsoever; it should not be viewed differently than, say, building a church, a community center or a druid shrine.

A more realistic explanation is that most Americans do not buy the 19 fanatics story, but view the the 9/11 assault as a product of an anti- American ideology that, for good and bad reasons, has found a fertile breeding ground in the hearts and minds of many Muslim youngsters who see their Muslim identity inextricably tied with this anti-American ideology.

THE GROUND Zero mosque is being equated with that ideology. Public objection to the mosque thus represents a vote of no confidence in mainstream American Muslim leadership which, on the one hand, refuses to acknowledge the alarming dimension that anti-Americanism has taken in their community and, paradoxically, blames America for its creation.

The American Muslim leadership has had nine years to build up trust by taking proactive steps against the spread of anti-American terror-breeding ideologies, here and abroad.

Evidently, however, a sizable segment of the American public is not convinced that this leadership is doing an effective job of confidence building.

In public, Muslim spokespersons praise America as the best country for Muslims to live and practice their faith. But in sermons, speeches, rallies, classrooms, conferences and books sold at those conferences, the narrative is often different. There, Noam Chomsky’s conspiracy theory is the dominant paradigm, and America’s foreign policy is one long chain of “crimes” against humanity, especially against Muslims.

Affirmation of these conspiratorial theories sends mixed messages to young Muslims, engendering anger and helplessness: America and Israel are the first to be blamed for Muslim failings, sufferings and violence.

Terrorist acts, whenever condemned, are immediately “contextually explicated” (to quote Tariq Ramadan); spiritual legitimizers of suicide bombings (e.g. Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi of Qatar) are revered beyond criticism; Hamas and Hizbullah are permanently shielded from the label of “terrorist.”

Overall, the message that emerges from this discourse is implicit, but can hardly be missed: When Muslim grievance is at question, America is the culprit and violence is justified, if not obligatory.

True, we have not helped Muslims in the confidence-building process. Treating homegrown terror acts as isolated incidents of psychological disturbances while denying their ideological roots has given American Muslim leaders the illusion that they can achieve public acceptance without engaging in serious introspection and responsibility sharing for allowing victimhood, anger and entitlement to spawn such acts.

The construction of the Ground Zero mosque would further prolong this illusion.

If I were New York’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg, I would reassert Muslims’ right to build the Islamic center and the mosque, but I would expend the same energy, not one iota less, in trying to convince them to put it somewhere else, or replace it with a community-managed all-faiths center in honor of the 9/11 victims.


Fellow Muslim Americans will benefit more from co-ownership of consensual projects than sole ownership of confrontational ones.

The writer is a professor at UCLA and president of the Daniel Pearl Foundation, named after his son. He is a coeditor of I Am Jewish: Personal Reflections Inspired by the Last Words of Daniel Pearl (Jewish Light, 2004), winner of the National Jewish Book Award.

see also:
"The Islamic Exception"
Do Muslims really bear no responsibility at all for 9/11?
The right to oppose Islam
Sam Harris: Islam is Different. (Duh.)
A Plague On Both Their Houses: Notes Toward a Renewal of Liberal Anticlericalism

"The Islamic Exception"

"To be honest, the people prefer the Taliban."
Afghan tribal elder

In 1736, Voltaire wrote, "Every sensible man, every honorable man, must hold the Christian sect in horror." (Tout homme sensé, tout homme de bien, doit avoir la secte chrétienne en horreur.)

Similar sentiments concerning Christianity -- some more diplomatic, others even more harshly worded -- can be found in the writings of many of the greatest literary, philosophical, and political figures over the last five centuries of Western history (as well as among many modern day writers and thinkers, including many prominent historians and scholars of religion).

But the fact remains that Western culture is still, in the 21st century, predominantly Christian, and, therefore, it should come as no surprise that there continues to be a strong counter-current in Western thought that not only defends Christianity, but that seeks to portray all criticism of it as intemperate and ill-informed at best, and persecutory at worst.

No clearer example of this counter-current could be asked for than that of the spectacle of Christians claiming "discrimination" whenever the establishment clause of the first amendment is consistently adhered to!

In the past, attempts to portray Christianity and Christians as the poor victims of shameful bigotry whenever anyone dares to articulate perfectly reasonable, and factually well-supported, criticisms of their religion, have been left to reactionaries aligned with the most unabashedly regressive and authoritarian elements of Protestantism and Catholicism. But more recently, a "progressive" discourse of exculpatory religious apologetics, hiding behind the facade of "multiculturalism", has been making its shrill, monotonous voice increasingly heard. And now the religion being defended is Islam.

Among the favorite mantras of the multiculturalist defenders of Islam is the insistence that extremists make up only a tiny, isolated fraction of Muslims. However, this is disproven quite undeniably every single time there is an election in a predominantly Muslim country, and it is often painfully obvious even when there are no elections. A tribal elder in the Baghlan district of Afghanistan recently told New York Times reporter Alissa Rubin: “To be honest, the people prefer the Taliban."

The following is excerpted from Fareed Zakaria's 2003 book The Future of Freedom. (It should be noted that Zakaria is himself a Muslim and a vocal supporter of those who wish to build a lavish mosque complex at Ground Zero). The excerpt comprises the opening paragraphs of Chapter Four of Zakaria's book, which is titled "The Islamic Exception."

It is always the same splendid setting, and the same sad story. A senior diplomat enters one of the grand presidential palaces in Heliopolis, the neighborhood of Cairo from which President Hosni Mubarak rules over Egypt. He walks through halls of marble, through rooms filled with gilded furniture -- all a bad imitation of imperial French style that has been jokingly called "Louis Farouk" (after the last king of Egypt). Passing layers of security guards, he arrives at a formal drawing room where he is received with courtesy by the Egyptian president. The two talk amiably about U.S.-Egyptian relations, regional affairs, and the state of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Then the American gently raises the issue of human rights and suggests that Egypt's government might ease up on political dissent, allow more press freedoms, and stop jailing intellectuals. Mubarak tenses us and snaps, "If I were to do what you ask, Islamic fundamentalists will take over Egypt. Is that what you want?" The conversation moves back to the latest twist in the peace process.

Over the years Americans and Arabs have had many such exchanges. When President Bush urged Palestinian leader Yasser Aragat to agree to the Camp David peace plan that been negotiated in July 2001, Arafat reportedly responded with words to this effect: "If I do what you want, Hamas will be in power tomorrow." The Saudi monarchy's most articulate spokesman, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, often reminds American officials that if they press his government too hard, the likely alternative to the regime is not Jeffersonian democracy but a Taliban style theocracy.

The worst part of it is, they might be right. The Arab rulers of the Middle East are autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed. But are still more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic than what would likely replace them. Elections in many Arab countries would produce politicians who espouse views that are closer to Osama bin Laden's that those of Jordan's liberal monarch, King Abdullah. Last year the emir of Kuwait, with American encouragement, proposed giving women the vote. But the democratically elected Kuwaiti parliament -- filled with Islamic fundamentalists -- roundly rejected the initiative. Saudi crown prince Abdullah tried something much less dramatic when he proposed that women in Saudi Arabia be allowed to drive. (They are currently forbidden to do so, which means that Saudi Arabia has to import half a million chauffeurs from places like India and the Philippines.) But the religious conservatives mobilized popular opposition and forced him to back down.

A similar dynamic is evident elsewhere in the Arab world. In Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco, on virtually every political issue, the monarchs are more liberal that the societies over which they reign. Even in the Palestinian territories, where secular nationalists like Arafat and his Palestine Liberation Organization have long been the most popular political force, militant and religious groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad are gaining strength, especially among the young. And although they speak the language of elections, many of the Islamic parties have been withering in their contempt for democracy, which they see as a Western form of government. They would happily come to power through an election, but then woudl set up their own theocratic rule. It would be, as the saw has it, one man, one vote, one time.
[pp. 119-121]

see also:
Do Muslims really bear no responsibility at all for 9/11?
The right to oppose Islam
A Plague On Both Their Houses: Notes Toward a Renewal of Liberal Anticlericalism