Why Claude Levi-Strauss matters: "We must address with song every object we meet."

The thought we call primitive is founded on this demand for order. This is equally true of all thought but it is through the properties common to all thought that we can most easily begin to understand forms of thought which seem very strange to us.

A native thinker makes the penetrating comment that 'All sacred things must have their place'. It could even be said that being in their place is what makes them sacred for if they were taken out of their place, even in thought, the entire order of the universe would be destroyed. Sacred objects therefore contribute to the maintenance of order in the universe by occupying the places allocated to them. Examined superficially and from the outside, the refinements of ritual can appear pointless. They are explicable by a concern for what one might call 'micro-adjustment' -- the concern to assign every single creature, object or feature to a place within a a class. The ceremony of the Hako among the Pawnee is particularly illuminating in this respect, although only because it has been so well analysed. The invocation which accompanies the crossing of a stream of water is divided into several parts, which correspond, respectively, to the moment when the travellers put their feet in the water, the moment when they move them and the moment when the water completely covers their feet. The invocation to the wind separates the moment when only wet parts of the body feel cool: 'Now, we are ready to move forward in safety'. As the informant explains: 'We must address with song every object we meet, because Tira'wa (the supreme spirit) is in all things, everything we come to as we travel can give us help ....'
[Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, p. 10 (Chicago, 1966)]

The solution of a solid into a liquid alters the disposition of its molecules. It also often provides an efficacious method of putting them by so that they can be recovered in case of need and their properties be better studied. The reductions I am envisaging are thus legitimate, or indeed possible, only if two conditions are satisfied. First, the phenomena subjected to reduction must not be impoverished; one must be certain that everything contributing to their distinctive richness and originality has been collected around them. For it is pointless to pick up a hammer unless to hit the nail on the head.

Secondly, one must be ready to accept, as a consequence of each reduction, the total overturning of any preconceived idea concerning the level, whichever it may be, one is striving to attain. The idea of some general humanity to which ethnographic reduction leads, will bear no relation to any one may have formed in advance. And when we do finally succeed in understanding life as a function of inert matter it will be to discover that the latter has properties very different from those previously attributed to it. Levels of reduction cannot therefore be classed as superior and inferior, for the level taken as superior must, through the reduction, be expected to communicate retroactively some of its richness to the inferior level to which it will have been assimilated. Scientific explanation consists not in moving from the complex to the simple but in the replacement of a less intelligible complexity by one which is more so.
[The Savage Mind, pp. 247-248]

"Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda experience" (Heart of Darkness, Part Four)

Heart of Darkness:
Part One: "By This Sign We Prosper"
Part Two: Christian Demographics Fun Facts
Part Three: Doing the Lord's Work In Rwanda
Part Four: Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from Rwanda
Part Five: Preparing the Way for Genocide in Rwanda
..............................................................................................

In the aftermath of the horrendous bloodletting that took place in Rwanda in 1994, a comprehensive report was produced by the Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Most of this post will consist of two lengthy excerpts from one of their reports: Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors, and a third, shorter, excerpt from their Synthesis Report. In total, five reports, including the "synthesis", were published and are available at the ReliefWeb website. ReliefWeb is administered by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

All emphases and sub-headings are from the original. Selected references are given at the bottom of this post, but see the original for complete bibliography and more details on the sources. In particular there is this annotated bibliography as part of the first report.

The main authors for the Historical Perspective report are Tor Sellström and Lennart Wohlgemuth of the The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden

The Pre-Colonial Period (first excerpt)

The first European travellers who reached central Rwanda noted a socio-economic and "ethnic" stratification between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. Tutsi were described as distinct in terms of origin, economic activities, social status and physical appearance, although sharing the language, religion and settlement with Hutu (von Götzen, 1895; Kandt, 1921). This description of Rwandese "ethnic groups" - partly based on indigenous mythology - was upheld and diffused by outsiders, colonial agents, ethnographers, anthropologists, historians etc. and came to represent the generalized Western view of the Rwandese people. It seems, however, that the people themselves identified each other rather according to clan affiliation. In a number of studies, David Newbury has shown that while the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" existed in pre-colonial times, they did not have the same significance as in the recent era, and the meaning of an "ethnic" identity varied from place to place and over time. There was no single universal definition of ethnic identity, valid for all regions at one time (D. Newbury, 1979, 1980; C. Newbury, 1988).

The amalgamation of the statelets into a united Rwanda was a process spread over several hundred years. The core Nyiginya state in eastern Rwanda slowly expanded by conquest and by giving protection, in return receiving tribute. Not until the second part of the 19th century under mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri was Rwanda united as one country. Under Rwabugiri, the mwami was the source and symbol of all authority in the politically-centralized state. Some smaller states, however, stayed autonomous until 1910-20. This was, for example, the case of the northern region near Ruhengeri, which was only incorporated into the Rwandese monarchy under German colonial rule. It took several military expeditions by the German Schutztruppe, assisted by Tutsi from central Rwanda between 1910 and 1912, before the northern Hutu - also known as Kiga - were defeated, leaving considerable bitterness towards both the Tutsi and the southern Hutu, called Banyanduga, who came with them (Dorsey, 1994; Waller, 1993). Thus, to this day, the northerners form a distinctive sub-culture, in which contacts with Tutsi have been less frequent and the awareness of a pre-Tutsi past more pronounced than in other parts of Rwanda (Lemarchand, 1970 and 1995).

The reign of Rwabugiri, or Kigeri IV, lasted from 1860 to 1895, i.e. just before the arrival of European colonialism, and marks an important watershed in the history of Rwanda. Rwabugiri broke through traditional restraints and increased the prerogatives of the throne. He is considered the last of the great reformers and is also referred to as the great warrior king. His domestic policies reflected two complementary goals, namely centralization of power and extension of the central political structures to peripheral areas of the kingdom. In foreign policy, he led a series of military campaigns against the smaller Hutu statelets in both western and eastern Rwanda, eventually incorporating them under his crown. The northern and south-western parts, however, remained largely autonomous. To undermine the hereditary power held by old Tutsi families, Rwabugiri dismissed incumbent officials and appointed men who were directly dependent on him, notably in regions that previously had been relatively independent, thereby increasing the material resources available to the monarchy (Dorsey, 1994).

The Colonial Period and Independence (second excerpt)

During 40 years of Belgian administration, as under most colonial dispensations, we observe the disintegration, distortion or bastardization of indigenous social and political structures and their consequences. For example, while the indigenous pre-colonial patron/client relationship was flexible and contained an important element of reciprocity, the Belgian colonizers actually rigidified the system and did away with mutual obligations. By "reinforcing" a Rwandese institution, the colonizers in this way introduced forced labour and strengthened the socio-economic divisions between Tutsi and Hutu. The same abuse of other pre-colonial institutions could be quoted. Balandier has described this phenomenon in terms of the following features: the falling into abeyance of traditional political entities, the overall deterioration as a result of depoliticization, the breakdown of traditional systems of power control, the incompatibility of the two systems of power and authority and, finally, the abuse of power (Balandier, 1978). What is of interest here is the extent to which such developments affected ethnic inter-relations in Rwanda.

Among the European civil servants and missionaries operating in the Great Lakes region at the turn of the century, the so-called Hamitic thesis became generalized. According to this thesis, "everything of value in Africa had been introduced by the Hamites, supposedly a branch of the Caucasian race" (Sanders, 1969). When the well-known British explorer John Speke arrived in the Buganda kingdom (in present-day Uganda) with its sophisticated political organization, he attributed this civilization to an indigenous race of nomadic pastoralists related to the (Ethiopian) Galla "Hamites". For Europeans, the attractiveness of this hypothesis lay in the fact that it allowed for linking physical characteristics with mental capacity: the "Hamites" were supposed to be born leaders and, in principle, had the right to a history and a future almost as noble as that of their European "cousins" (Linden, 1977). In Rwanda, the "Hamites" were Tutsi: "they resemble the negro only in the colour of their skin" (Jamoulle, 1927); "before becoming black these people were tanned" (de Lacger, 1961); "his stature resembles more closely that of a white person rather than that of a negro - in fact, it would not be an exaggeration to state that he is a European who happens to have a black skin..." (Gahama, 1983). This racist thesis was expressed in innumerable ways, but, in short, Tutsi were considered to be related to Europeans and, therefore, the Europeans could easily work with them. It, thus, also served the colonial policy of divide-and-rule (Adekanye, 1995).

By the end of the 1920s, the Hamitic hypothesis was to be utilized with far-reaching consequences for ethnic relations in Rwanda. Within the framework of an administrative reform process (culminating in the Programme Voisin of 1926-1931), especially a regrouping and enlarging of chiefdoms (out of around 200 chiefs only 40 remained in the new system), it was decided to give preferential treatment to Tutsi when recruiting indigenous political authorities. It would seem that the particular position taken on the matter by Monsignor Leon-Paul Classe, the Vicar Apostolic to Rwanda, was of considerable influence. In a letter dated 21 September 1927, he wrote to Georges Mortehan, the Belgian Resident Commissioner:

If we want to be practical and look after the real interest of the country we shall find a remarkable element of progress with the Mututsi youth [...] Ask the Bahutu whether they prefer to be given orders by uncouth persons or by nobles and the answer will be clear: they will prefer the Batutsi, and quite rightly so. Born chiefs, the latter have a knack of giving orders. [...] Here lies the secret of how they managed to settle in this country and hold it in their grip (de Lacger, 1961).

Faced with what he sees as "hesitations and foot-dragging of the colonial administration regarding the traditional hegemony of the well-born Batutsi", Monsignor Classe - in 1930 - issues a stern warning:

the greatest harm the government could possibly inflict on itself and on the country would be to do away with the Mututsi caste. Such a revolution would lead the country straight into anarchy and towards a viciously anti-European communism. Far from achieving progress, this will annihilate any action taken by the government for the latter would be deprived of auxiliaries who are born capable of comprehension and obedience. [...] As a rule, we cannot possibly have chiefs who'd be better, more intelligent, more active, more capable of understanding the idea of progress and even more likely to be accepted by the population, than the Batutsi (Classe, 1930).

The Vicar Apostolic's message was seen as a strong plea in favour of - at least in principle - a Tutsi monopoly. His intervention put an end to the "hesitations and foot-dragging" of the administration. The Hutu chiefs and deputy-chiefs were removed and replaced by Tutsi. Furthermore, a policy favouring protection and strengthening of the Tutsi hegemony was vigorously pursued. Therefore, and given that traditionally Hutu, and even Twa, exercised certain political power, albeit at lower levels, the "Tutsification" of the 1930s resulted in a monopoly of political and administrative power in the hands of Tutsi. With the abolition of the three-fold hierarchy of the chiefs (army chief, cattle chief and land chief), this policy accentuated the ethnic divisions (Reyntjens, 1985). It was also reinforced by the introduction of identity cards in 1933. Every Rwandese was henceforth (on the basis of quite arbitrary criteria) registered as Tutsi, Hutu or Twa (Reyntjens, 1985).

Finally, the possibilities of most Hutu were further limited by the discrimination introduced in the Catholic schools, which represented the dominant educational system throughout the colonial period. Tutsi who had resisted conversion became increasingly enrolled in the Catholic mission schools. To accommodate and further encourage this process, the Church adjusted its educational policies and openly favoured Tutsi and discriminated against Hutu. With some exceptions, Hutu received only the education required for working in the mines and in industry (C. Newbury, 1988).

In summary, the monopolization of power in the hands of Tutsi constituted a crucial and undisputed factor in firmly establishing ("structuring") the ethnic cleavage. This colonial intervention caused the groups to become distinct political categories. In a certain sense, we have here an instance of ethnogenesis (Roosens, 1989), which in the case of Rwanda would inevitably lead to a reaction on the part of Hutu that they had been excluded from power. Tutsi discourse has drawn inordinate conclusions from the alleged ethnogenesis by claiming that, before the arrival of the Europeans, the people of Rwanda (and Burundi) were quite homogeneous and that, through their policy of divide-and-rule, the colonial authorities deliberately introduced ethnic cleavages. Yet the ethnic groups existed before colonialism. Colonial policies were merely grafted onto a foundation that already contained a potential for conflict (Reyntjens, 1994).

From the mid-1950s, political demands in Rwanda were formulated in ethnic terms. The opposing theses were expressed, rather stereotypically, in three main documents: on the one hand, the Bahutu Manifesto of March 24, 1957 and, on the other, two letters by the great Tutsi chiefs ("Abagaragu b'ibwami bakuru") (Nkundabagenzi, 1961). Putting the ethnic problem in a social context, the Bahutu Manifesto demanded Hutu emancipation as well as democratization. Starting from the colonial thesis that Tutsi were outsiders/foreigners and claiming that Hutu (in majority) were true Rwandese nationals, and thus the rightful rulers of Rwanda, the manifesto was a significant statement for both the social revolution from 1959 and the deepening ethnic cleavage. This important document, originally published as "Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native Problem in Rwanda" and aiming to influence a United Nations Trusteeship mission to the territory, was drafted by nine Hutu intellectuals. Among the signatories was the future president, Grégoire Kayibanda. It attacked the whole concept of Belgian administration and maintained that the basic problem of Rwanda was a conflict between Hutu and Hamitic - i.e. foreign - Tutsi (Dorsey, 1994; Prunier, 1995). The two letters written by the conservative great chiefs (and which did not necessarily express the point of view of the whole Tutsi political elite) rejected Hutu participation "because our kings conquered the land of the Bahutu, killed their 'little' kings and thus subjugated the Bahutu; how, then, can they now pretend to be our brothers?" (Reyntjens, 1994).

When political parties were set up in the late 1950s, political structures had already been established along the ethnic cleavage: Parmehutu (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation des Bahutu) and APROSOMA (Association pour la promotion sociale des masses) were essentially Hutu, whereas UNAR (Union nationale rwandaise) and RADER (Rassemblement démocratique rwandais) were essentially Tutsi. At the parliamentary elections of September 1961, the cleavage was confirmed: the Hutu parties obtained about 83% of the vote, corresponding roughly to the proportion of Hutu among the population. In other words, a demographic majority came to be matched by a political majority. From 1965 onwards, following the elimination of the opposition (partly by physical, partly by political means), Rwanda was a de facto single party state; and in essence (Hutu) mono-ethnic (Reyntjens, 1985).

From the time of mwami Rwabugiri until the monarchy was abolished in 1961, the kingdom of Rwanda was a highly organized and stratified state. This was reinforced by communal reforms during the colonial period. The latest major communal reform took place in 1960, once again confirming the very organized structure of the Rwandese state. The country was divided into 10 préfectures, each divided into a number of communes. These, which numbered 143 in total, formed the basis for development. The communes were each divided into 4-5 secteurs and these into "cells" (10 "cells" per secteur). Taking after the Tanzanian model, the final organizational unit was the 10-household cell comprising some 80 people. Few African countries were so well organized and also used the structures set up so extensively as Rwanda (Reyntjens, 1985).

Transition to independence

The revolution of 1959-1961, with the support of the Belgian administration (Harroy, 1984; Logiest, 1988), led to the abolition of the monarchy and to the removal of all political and administrative Tutsi structures on which, for decades, Belgium had based its policy of indirect rule. The peasants' (or Hutu) revolt was largely provoked by the intransigence of a conservative political and administrative elite, which flatly refused any democratization, demanded not only by an emerging Hutu elite, but also by a Tutsi counter-elite, far more progressive than the one in power (Reyntjens, 1994). Though, initially, the number of victims was rather small, the attempts on the part of the Tutsi-led traditional power-elite to maintain authoritarian rule led to violent clashes. The Belgians supported the revolt. The abolition of the monarchy and the rise of a Hutu elite became definitive in September 1961 when, at a referendum, 80% of the electorate voted in favour of a republic. At the same time, the results of the parliamentary elections showed a correspondingly clear victory for the Hutu-dominated parties.

The events of 1959-62: reversal and confrontation

Most observers agree that the revolutionary transition from the Tutsi-dominated monarchy to the Hutu-led republic, which took place between November 1959 and September 1961, culminating in the proclamation of Independence on 1 July, 1962, constitutes a crucial period for the understanding of the subsequent ethnic division of the country (Reyntjens, 1985; Lema, 1993; C. Newbury, 1988). During this brief period - initiated by the 1959 jacquérie or so-called peasant revolt - the historical tables were turned. Under pressure from the democratic winds of change over Africa, the Belgian authorities shifted their support from the Tutsi aristocracy to the majority Hutu, withdrew their backing of the mwami, abandoned the policy of indirect rule and hastily brought Rwanda (and Burundi) to national independence. This process, as noted by Linden (1995), marked the beginning of a cycle of turbulent clashes for power, where "capture of the Rwandan state from political opponents has been a violent zero-sum game in which the winner takes all". The struggle for state power in an arena abandoned both by the colonial power and its former ally, the traditional monarchy, explains why the ethnic exacerbations came to the fore. While Tutsi, through their dominant position in colonial society, already saw themselves as a group, it was now felt necessary by the emerging Hutu political elite to appeal to a common "Hutu-ness" of the underprivileged to challenge the indigenous leadership successfully, compete for the vacant state and redress historical injustices.

Towards the end of the 1950s, the Belgian authorities suddenly started to pay marked attention to the situation of the Hutu peasant majority. A similar, radical change of mind occurred within the Catholic church, as exemplified by the pastoral letter issued by Monsignor André Perraudin in the late 1950s, in which he adopted a pro-Hutu attitude by stating that the social discrimination faced by the Hutu was no longer consistent with a sound organization of Rwandese society (Reyntjens, 1994).

On 1 November, 1959, ethnic violence broke out as a result of a leader of the Parmehutu party being molested by Tutsi youth. The ensuing riots led to a widespread Hutu uprising, during which hundreds of Tutsi were killed. The Belgian government responded by sending troops to the country. Contrary to contemporary expectations, however, the Belgian military did not attempt to crush the Hutu revolt, but adopted a de facto pro-Hutu policy through the installation of a military-led administration and the appointment of more than 300 Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs to replace those Tutsi incumbents who had been deposed, killed or had fled during the initial stages of the uprising. (C. Newbury, 1988; Prunier, 1995). Soon thereafter - in May 1960 - the Belgian authorities confirmed the new policy through the setting up of an indigenous military territorial guard of 650 men, based on ethnic proportionality, with 85% Hutu and 15% Tutsi.

As stated above, the tables were turned. This was further confirmed in the local elections held in June-July 1960, which left the Tutsi-dominated political parties with merely 16% of the votes and, thus, resulted in an overwhelming Hutu victory. Following the elections, no less than 211 out of 229 bourgemestres were Hutu (C. Newbury, 1988). In this situation, and against a background of continued ethnic clashes, mwami Kigeri V opted to leave Rwanda on 29 June, 1960, officially to attend the independence celebrations in the Congo. He was, however, never to return.

Belgium's policy in Rwanda encountered severe criticism in the General Assembly of the United Nations. From December 1960 to June 1962, it called on different occasions for reconciliation with both the mwami and imprisoned Tutsi representatives, also urged Belgium to keep Rwanda and Burundi together, but to no avail. Instead, the Belgian authorities proceeded to strengthen the process towards Rwandese independence through the granting of internal autonomy under a temporary government led by the founder of Parmehutu, Grégoire Kayibanda, a Hutu leader from the Gitarama region in central Rwanda. Throughout this period the ethnic confrontation between Hutu and Tutsi not only continued, but escalated, with mainly Tutsi killed, expelled or exiled.

The transition from Tutsi to Hutu political domination was sealed through the parliamentary elections of 25 September 1961, which resulted in a crushing victory for the Hutu-led parties. Parme- hutu obtained no less than 78% of the votes, gaining 35 seats out of 44, while UNAR (the Tutsi-dominated party) received 17% and seven seats. A simultaneous referendum led to an equally massive rejection of the monarchy in favour of a republican system of government. Following the elections, Grégoire Kayibanda was elected President by the new parliament on 26 October, 1961, appointing a government that initially was composed of members of Parmehutu, UNAR and APROSOMA. Eight months later, on 1 July 1962, Rwanda and Burundi finally gained formal independence as two sovereign states, a fact the General Assembly of the United Nations reluctantly had to endorse.

During the ensuing three decades, the Hutu jacquérie of 1959 and the events leading to independence in 1962 came to constitute crucial points of reference in the political life of Rwanda, positively or negatively, depending on the fears or hopes of those involved.

Some Explanatory Factors (third excerpt)

[Taken from the summary of Study I, Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors, which was prepared by Lennart Wohlgemuth and Tor Sellström.]

The German colonial (1899-1916) and Belgian trusteeship (1916-1961) policy of indirect rule, favouring the strengthening of Tutsi hegemony and resulting in a political and administrative monopoly in the hands of the aristocratic Tutsi overlords of the Nyiginya clan from the 1920s. Under the influence of the so-called hamitic thesis, this policy culminated in 1933 with the introduction of compulsory identity cards, reinforcing and accelerating the late pre-colonial process towards a separation of Tutsi and Hutu (and Twa). From then on, all Rwandese had to relate to "their" respective ethnic group, which in turn determined avenues and fortunes in society. Under European colonialism, a policy of "ethnogenesis" was actively pursued, i.e. a politically-motivated creation of ethnic identities based on socially-constituted categories of the pre-colonial past. The minority Tutsi became the haves and the majority Hutu the have-nots.

The abrupt change by Belgium only some 25 years later, when - under the influence of the general decolonization process in Africa, the build-up towards political independence in the Congo (Zaire) and in a belated attempt to redress past injustices -the colonial administration (and the Catholic church) shifted support from the minority Tutsi to the majority Hutu. This eased the way for the so-called peasant, or Hutu, revolution of 1959-61, through which Rwanda underwent a profound transition from a Tutsi dominated monarchy to a Hutuled independent republic in less than three years. The replacement of one political elite by another introduced a new dimension of political and social instability and a potential for future ethnic violence. The events of 1959-61 also forced tens of thousands of Tutsi into exile in neighbouring countries, from where groups of refugees began to carry out armed incursions into Rwanda, sowing the seeds of the country's ethnically-defined refugee problem.

Developments in Rwanda are, finally, closely related to developments in the Great Lakes region, comprising Rwanda, eastern Zaire, Uganda, north-western Tanzania and Burundi. This is the historical region of the Banyarwanda, i.e. the people who speak the language of Rwanda, Kinyarwanda, and who throughout modern history share a common heritage. It was violated by European powers, who at the turn of the century divided the region and the people into Belgian, British and German colonial dominions, with far-reaching consequences for later, including the most recent, events. Thus regional political, economic, social and cultural dynamics - taking the form of, among other things, cross-border flows of refugees, weapons, ideas and fears - must be borne in mind when considering solutions to Rwanda's problems, as well as the problems of -above all - Burundi and Zaire. If not, the ghastly events in Rwanda in 1994 could easily draw the entire region into similar, or still greater, human tragedies.

partial bibliography

Adekanye, J. B. (1995:1). "Structural Adjustment. Democratization and Rising Ethnic Tensions in Africa." Development and Change 26 (no 2): 355-374.
Adekanye, J. B. (1995:2). Rwanda/Burundi: "Uni-ethnic" dominance and the cycle of armed ethnic formations. Oslo, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO).
Balandier, G. (1978). Anthropologie politique. Paris, PUF (3 ed.).
Classe, L. (1930). "Pour moderniser le Ruanda." L'Essor colonial et maritime (489, 4/12/1930).
de Lacger, L. (1939). Le Rwanda. Namur, Kabgayi, Editions Grands-Lacs.
de Lacger, L. (1961). Rwanda. Kabgayi (2 ed.).
Dorsey, L. (1994). Historical Dictionary of Rwanda. London, The Scarecrow Press.
Harroy, J.-P. (1984). Rwanda. De la féodalité à la démocratie. Brussels/Paris, Hayez/Académie des sciences d'Outre-Mer.
Kandt, R. (1921). Caput Nili. Eine Empfindsame Reise zu den Quellen des Nils. Berlin, Dietrich Reimer.
Lema, A. (1993). Africa divided. The creation of "ethnic groups". Lund, Lund University Press.
Lemarchand, R. (1966). "Power and stratification in Rwanda. A reconsideration." Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines no. 24.
Lemarchand, R. (1970). Rwanda and Burundi. London, Pall Mall Press.
Lemarchand, R. (1995). Rwanda: The rationality of genocide.
Linden, I. (1977). Church and revolution in Rwanda. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
Linden, I. (1995). "The Churches and genocide: lessons from Rwanda." Svensk Missionstidskrift 83 (3/1995): 5-15.
Logiest, G. (1988). Mission au Rwanda. Un Blanc dans la bagarre Tutsi-Hutu. Brussels, Didier Hattier.
Newbury, C. (1974). "Deux lignages au Kinyaga." Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines 14 (1).
Newbury, C. (1978). "Ethnicity in Rwanda: The case of Kinyaga." International African Institute 48 (1).
Newbury, C. (1988). The cohesion of oppression. Clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960. New York, Columbia University Press.
Newbury, C. (1991). Rwanda: Recent debates over governance and rural development. G. Hyden & M. Bratton (eds.): Governance and politics in Africa: 193-219.
Newbury, D. (1979). Kings and Clans: Ijwi Island (Zaïre) c. 1780-1840, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Newbury, D. (1980:1). "The clans of Rwanda: An historical hypothesis." Africa (50, 4).
Newbury, D. (1980:2). "What role has kingship?" Africa-Tervuren.
Newbury, D. (1987). 'Bunyabungu': The western Rwandan frontier, c. 1750-1850. I. Kopytoff (ed.): The African frontier: The reproduction of traditional African societies. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
Nkundabagenzi, F., Ed. (1961). Rwanda politique 1958-1960. Brussels, CRISP.
Prunier, G. (1992). L'Ouganda et le Front patriotique rwandais. A. Guichaoua (ed.): Enjeux nationaux et dynamiques régionales dans l'Afrique des Grands Lacs.
Prunier, G. (1993). "Eléments pour une histoire du Front patriotique rwandais." Politique africaine vol. 51.
Prunier, G. (1995). The Rwandese Crisis (1959-1994). London, Hurst.
Reyntjens, F. (1985). Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda. Tervuren, Musée Royale de l'Afrique Centrale.
Reyntjens, F. (1994:1). L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise. Rwanda, Burundi: 1988-1994. Paris, Editions Karthala.
Reyntjens, F. (1994:2). "Sujets d'inquiétude au Rwanda, en Octobre 1994." Dialogue (no. 179): 3-14.
Reyntjens, F. (1995). "Rwanda. Background to a genocide." Bulletin des séances (Académie Royale des Sciences
d'Outre-Mer, Brussels) (4/95).
Reyntjens, F. (1995:1). Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence. London, Minority Rights Group.
Reyntjens, F. (1995:2). "L'an un du 'nouveau Rwanda'." Le Soir (20-21 July 1995).
Sanders, E. R. (1969). "The Hamitic hypothesis: its origin and function in time perspective." Journal of African History: 521-532.
von Götzen, G. A. (1895). Durch Africa von Ost nach West. Berlin.
Waller, D. (1993). Rwanda: Which way now? Oxford, Oxfam.

Doing the Lord's Work in Rwanda (Heart of Darkness, Part Three)

Heart of Darkness:
Part One: "By This Sign We Prosper"
Part Two: Christian Demographics Fun Facts
Part Three: Doing the Lord's Work In Rwanda
Part Four: Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from Rwanda
Part Five: Preparing the Way for Genocide in Rwanda

"Those Living In Darkness"

An article published in Sojourners magazine online in January of this year (2009) begins:

If you read Christian mission journals and textbooks from the 1980s, Rwanda is often held up as a model of evangelization in Africa. Nowhere else on the continent was Christianity so well received. Church growth was unprecedented. Seminarians in the United States studied Rwanda, asking how they might use similar strategies elsewhere to share the good news of Jesus Christ with those living in darkness.

Yet in 1994 an unimaginable darkness descended on Rwanda. The most Christianized country in Africa became the site of its worst genocide. Christians killed other Christians, often in the same churches where they had worshiped together. Accordingly, this is not a story about something that happened to a strange people in a faraway place. It happened among the body of Christ, of which we are members. Rwanda is a lot closer to Rome and Washington, D.C., than most of us care to think.

The article, titled The Pattern of this World , was written by Emmanuel M. Katongole and Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove. Katongole is a Catholic priest, a leader of the "Christian social ethics movement", the author of A Future for Africa, and a professor of theology at Duke University. Wilson-Hartgrove describes himself as a "New Monastic" and a "Christian Peacemaker", and in addition he is also a Baptist Associate Minister, and a Director of the School for Conversion. For their part, the self-proclaimed "mission" of the publication Sojourners "is to articulate the biblical call to social justice", and they identify themselves as "Christians for Justice and Peace." What we have here, then, is a somewhat updated version of a very old story.

The dichotomy between true and false religion is only one way of formulating the Mosaic distinction. It is just as common, or even more so, to pose this distinction in broader (or at least vaguer) terms, as an ultimate metaphysical struggle between all that is good and pure and all that is evil and polluted. This metaphysical struggle is often then concretized as a very real-world (if batman-esque) struggle for justice and against injustice. In fact, in the popular imagination the conflict between Moses and Pharaoh (the lead roles in the drama of the Mosaic Distinction in its classical version) is most likely to be seen primarily in terms of justice (Moses) and injustice (Pharaoh), and only secondarily, if at all, in religious terms.

Most people who listen, for example, to the words to Go Down Moses, or who hear references to Pharaoh in a Sunday Sermon, probably never even consider that Pharaoh might have had a religion at all! Here is how the populist, Progressive, anti-imperialist, bimetallist, prohibitionist, and evangelist (not to mention Secretary of State and three-time Presidential candidate) William Jennings Bryan spoke of Pharaoh in his 1923 book Famous Figures of the Old Testament:

Pharaoh set succeeding despots an example which they have not been slow to follow. When the Israelites complained of the severity of their overseers their tasks were increased. "Bricks without straw" has passed into the language of all nations as the most forcible description of requirements that are excessive, and the result is ever the same. Instead of silencing complaint, increased severity furnishes the stimulus necessary to deliverance. Cruelty brings about a reaction that counts in the final conflict and gives victory to the right.
[p. 28]

Bryan obviously could have cared less about any theological disputation between the ancient, inclusive polytheism of the Egyptians and the new, radically intolerant monotheism of Moses. In Bryan's view, Pharaoh was simply a cruel despot and the Israelites were the innocent victims of injustice and oppression. Why, religion had nothing to do with it!

If one goes to Sojourners' "Active Alerts" page you'll see a laundry list of "calls for action" that could be straight off of MoveOn's website or any similar bunch leftish do-gooders. That's because the Sojourners crowd don't really see themselves as the proponents of a particular religious point of view so much as the self-appointed protectors of all that is right, and the selfless guardians and wannabe saviors of all "those who live in darkness." While those that they oppose are simply wicked and despotic, whether we are talking about old Pharaoh or his modern day henchmen like Glenn Beck.

(Parenthetically it is worth mentioning that Christian activists occasionally, or possibly even often, end up supporting legitimate causes and opposing things and people that are unquestionably odious. In this Christians are just like their evil twins, the Communists. They both excel at exploiting real issues and manipulating genuine grievances to advance their own agendas, and this should not be news to anyone.)

There is, however, something new and interesting about the more modern, "progressive" version of the Mosaic distinction: Pharaoh is now a Christian! While this might seem odd if looked at objectively and rationally, in fact nothing could be more pleasing to the Christians than a mental universe which has been so thoroughly monopolized by them that they have to play the parts of the bad guys, too! The primordial struggle between Light and Darkness is thereby reduced to a battle between the good Christians and the bad ones.

Good Prophets, not to be confused with Bad Emperors

Before attempting to understand how Katongole and Wilson-Hartgrove's try to explain away the role of Christianity in the Rwandan genocide, lets take a look at another outspoken Christian progressive activist and his version of the good Christians versus bad Christians routine. Cornel West has posited a protracted internal struggle within Christianity between what he calls the "prophetic" and "Constantinian" strains of the religion. The idea of prophetic Christianity is not new, in fact it harkens back (obviously) to the Prophets of the Old Testament who arose long before Jesus came along (and whose prophecies early Christians relied on heavily in response to Pagan and Jewish critiques). Lets first look at the meaning of "prophetic" Christianity, by which West intends to indicate the good, "real" Christianity, before turning our attention to those bad "Constantinian" Christians.

The word "prophet" is used in a variety of ways in the books of the Old Testament, but its most straightforward usage is to designate a series of historical and semihistorical persons from the period immediately preceding the establishment of the Israelite monarchy up through and after the Babylonian captivity. In contrast to these Prophets, Moses is not a historical figure at all, nor is the "Exodus" a historical event. There is no direct (and vanishingly little indirect) evidence for the story of Moses and Pharaoh, at least in anything like the form in which they are known to Jews, Christians and Muslims (and anyone else who uncritically accepts the bed-time stories of the monotheists as actual history). But the Jewish people do have an actual history, and an archaeology as well. And according to that which can be historically and archaeologically documented, the Israelites were native to Canaan/Palestine, and their indigenous religion was comprised of worshipping Gods and Goddesses such as El, Baal, Asherath, etc, just as their neighbors did.

Over time, among one sub-group of Canaanites, the qualities and identities of the many Deities they worshipped congealed into a single Deity, an old war God name Yaweh (who may have originally been just one of seventy children of a husband-wife team Supreme Deities named El and Asherah). But even such monolatry and/or henotheism, which is not yet monotheism, is not present in the oldest books of the Old Testament, where other Gods besides Yahweh are acknowledged as real and independently existing. Proponents of this monotheizing trend very likely remained a distinct minority among Israelites during much of their early history (that is, history properly speaking).

Among the most prominent spokespersons for this (possibly minority) monotheizing (and eventually fully monotheistic) view were the so-called "Prophets". Let's look at just one of these Prophets: Isaiah. Mark Smith, in the final chapter of his The Origins of Biblical Monotheism, refers to chapters 40-55 of the Book of Isaiah (these chapters together are also sometimes referred to separately as "Second Isaiah") as "the parade example of biblical monotheism". This passage marks a clear transition from mere monolatrous henotheistic preliminaries to genuine full-throated monotheism. Here is how Smith puts it:

Yahweh becomes more than the god above all other gods: the existence of other gods is denied and the two images central to the "Second Isaiah's" presentation of Yahweh, the warrior-king and the creator, are melded and scored in the text to counter the perceived reality of other deities and therefore the putative stupidity of cultic devotion to their images .... Yahweh is not just the god of Israel (both land and people), but of all lands and nations.
[p. 179]

This is the true "prophetic tradition". It's core message is that of unvarnished religious bigotry: all other Gods besides Yahweh are imaginary, and those who do not worship Yahweh are fools. The intrinsic intolerance of this religious vision is well expressed by the sneering, accusatory, apocalyptic style of "Second Isaiah", a style that would be right at home on Glenn Beck's show or the 700 Club.

"Second Isaiah" attempts to identify polytheism and the worship of idols with outsiders and foreigners. The message is clear: any Israelites who does not worship the One True God are not true Israelites, they are followers of foreign beliefs and practices! The research of Mark Smith and many other contemporary scholars shows this to be nothing less than a lie. The people who are being called upon to recognize one and only one God historically worshipped a great many Goddesses and Gods, just like everyone else. It was now demanded that they reject their own spiritual traditions while simultaneously rejecting those of all their neighbors (with whom they had been more or less co-religionists up to this time).

Here are what Smith identifies as the "longest string of monotheistic statements" in Isaiah, 45:5-7, 14, 18, 21:

I am Lord and there is none else;
Beside me, there is no other god.
I engird you, though you have not known me,
So that they may know, from east to west,
That there is none but me.
I am the Lord and there is none else ...
Surely God is in you and there is none else,
There are no other gods ...
I am Yahweh, and there is none else ...
Am I not Yahweh?
And there are no other gods besides Me;
A just god and savior --
There is none besides Me.

"Second Isaiah" is especially noted for the mockery, scorn and ridicule directed at the sacred images central to the religious traditions of polytheistic "foreigners". Mark Smith shows that the author of "Second Isaiah" had detailed knowledge of the rituals of "washing the mouth" and "opening the mouth" of a sacred image. Before such rituals were completed the image was not yet truly sacred, but afterwards it is a representation of the Gods. Smith quotes a primary source to the effect that: "Without mouth opening this image does not smell incense, eat food, or drink water." And then Smith himself adds that "In short, the image in the ritual represents the god as recipient of the cult." [p. 184] The author of "Second Isaiah" revels in the task of sneeringly deconstructing these rituals in a way very reminiscent to the manner in which New Atheist phillistines hoot and howl about Francis Collins famous vision of three waterfalls. Some things, like the ugly face of intolerance, never really change.

So much for the prophetic tradition.

A Crisis in Christianity? Really? Since When?

Cornel West talked about his idea of Constantinian versus prophetic Christianity in a 2004 interview with Eduardo Medieta in Logos, "a journal of modern society & culture". West stated that then president George W. Bush "is the exemplar of Constantinian Christianity and imperial America.":

Constantinian Christianity has deep roots in America and so does imperialism. There is also a prophetic Christianity and a deep democratic tradition in America that cut against both of these, but they have always been in some ways weaker even though they made a difference in the making of the country....

I think that any time you have religious conflict you also have something else going on in addition to the clash of religion. There’s always a social dimension, an economic dimension, and a personal dimension going on. I think right now we’re experiencing a profound crisis of Christian identity in the country. There has always been a strong fundamentalist evangelical presence in the country that was highly suspicious of modern modes of skepticism, secularism, and criticism. Ironically, since Martin Luther King Jr., the Christian right began to learn lessons in terms of political organization and using their clout to bring power and pressure to bear because they saw the Civil Rights movement doing it on the other side of the ideological line. So they actually learned from brother Martin, the Jerry Farwells, and others and then received, of course, unbelievable economic support from many corporate elites. And it became clear that if there was going to be a realignment of American politics—a kind of Southernization of American politics using racially loaded terms, from busing to crime to welfare to prisons and so forth, to realign the American public—then the Christian right could be a major organized pillar for this. They were, in fact, brought in in a significant way to do that, and not simply because the elites themselves were Christians. Sometimes it was outright manipulation because you’ve got Machiavellian calculations going on at the highest levels of certain deeply conservative circles.

So you end up with not just Constantinian Christianity, but the Christian Right being a fundamental pillar for imperial America. Look at the relation of the Christian Right and conservative Jews in America. This is what is intriguing about the Mel Gibson film, you see, because you get the erosion of that. People know that anti-Semitism has always been part and parcel of the Christian right’s perspective and all of a sudden you get an alliance with conservative Jews defending Israel, based almost on blind faith, and now they discover, my god, our allies are anti-Semites! You don’t say. I could have told you that a long time ago. Pat Robertson has publicly said things far more Anti-Semitic than most. How is he going to be your ally? Well, because he supports Israel! Well, I thought that coalitions had something more substantive to them than merely a stance. The same is true with cutting back on domestic policy when it comes to social services, healthcare, jobs, education and so on. No, it’s pro-defense, no it’s pro-imperial expansion. The Christian Right, right now, is both powerful and dangerous and yet we know—and this is something we don’t like talking about in the academy—that if 72% of Americans view themselves as not just Christians, but believe in Jesus Christ son of God, then the fight for democracy in America is partly a fight for democratic possibilities in the American Christian tradition. If you lose the latter, you can forget the former. You can come up with the most sophisticated theories of democracy in the world, but if you’re not affecting the climate on the ground in such a way that certain Christians can think dem-o-cra-tic-ly and proceed politically under a radical democratic vision, then we’re not going to get anywhere. In fact, you end up just giving more and more over to the Christian Right and Christian centrists.

Cornel West is a brilliant man and, in my opinion, among the very few Americans who actually deserves to be called an intellectual. America is not a nation that produces what it has no use for, and one of the things that it has very little use for is intellectuals. And he is not just an intellectual, but very much a Christian intellectual. For all of its idiocies and deeply rooted irrationality, Christianity has proven to be, somehow, perfectly compatible with intelligence, even very high intelligence. But how surprising is that, really?

After all, weren't there brilliant Nazi intellectuals? Wasn't Robespierre a gifted student of the classics and an earnest admirer of Cicero and Cato long before he advocated "virtue combined with terror: virtue, without which terror is destructive; terror, without which virtue is impotent."? And wasn't Abimael Guzman a philosophy professor before he led Shining Path in a murderous rampage, killing an estimated 35,000 of his fellow Peruvians, many of them specifically targeted precisely because they were members of rival leftist groups? I guess it just shows to go ya, as I learned to say as a sprout back in Indiana.

And like any true intellectual tied to a deeply irrational ideology, West sometimes outsmarts himself. In particular, West doesn't appear to appreciate the precariousness of the position he places himself, indeed, all of Christendom, in when he traces the problems with Christianity, as he sees them, all the way back to Constantine. In doing so he has taken us dangerously close to the purported origins of Christianity itself.

In a previous post, specifically on Constantine, I discussed the "persistent misconception" that so-called "early" Christianity

was not only not intolerant, but that it was, as a matter of fact, a positively egalitarian social movement that was primarily based among the poor, slaves and women -- whose rights and well being it championed. According to this fairy tale version of early Christian history, it was only after Christians gained political power (that is, from the time of Constantine onward) that they became Great Big Meanies.

But please don't take my word for it. Classical historian and scholar of early Christianity Eric Francis Osborn compares the tolerance of ancient Paganism with the intolerance of early (that is, pre-Constantinian) Christians like this:

For Clement, paganism was the sordid scene of many gods and unspeakable mysteries, with some residual gleans of light from the universal Logos. For Justin and Tertullian, it was the world of good order and a promise of justice, compromised by the power of demons. The pagan gods were deceitful demons, hostile to Christians, who knew the truth about them. For Irenaeus, paganism hardly mattered; there were too many troubles ["heresies" and "heretics"] at home and too much to defend and declare. He thanked Rome for peace and safe travel (haer. 4.30.3). The pagan world was marked by exuberant variety, the 'shapeless profusion of polytheism', where all were tolerated and reverence for the past ensured that none was lost.
[The Emergence of Christian Theology, Eric Francis Osborn, p. 8]

It should come as no surprise that Clement (late first century), Justin (100-165), Tertulian (ca 160 - ca 220), and Irenaeus (late second century), were carrying on the proud tradition of exclusive, intolerant monotheism that can be traced back (at least) to Isaiah. And all of this a century or more before Constantine's vision of the cross.

But Cornel West, like Katongole and Wilson-Hartgrove, would like us to believe that there is now (now!) an internal crisis facing Christianity. But when did this crisis first confront Christianity? Certainly the institution of African Slavery posed such a crisis? And the native american genocide. And the Inquisition. And the witch-hunts. Implicitly acknowledging just this point, West comes only too close to the truth by admitting that whatever crisis there might be in Christianity today has it's roots in the (very) early history of that religion, not in recent events in american or world politics. And really, for anyone with ears to hear and eyes to see, once you have traced things all the way back to Constantine there is no justification, whatsoever, for stopping there.

But surely if we go back far enough, or look hard enough, there simply has to be an idyllic, humane, "progressive" Christianity of the past, untainted by all this conquering, colonizing and slave-trading, doesn't there? Well, the conquest of the New World was immediately preceded by the happy period of European History that many scholars now refer to, after R.I. More's book of the same title, as a Persecuting Society. Oh my, that doesn't sound promising at all, does it? But let's push on ... surely we'll find the original, good Christianity we've all heard so much about if only we keep the faith. Seek and ye shall find!

Well, one of the central, defining features of the medieval "persecuting society" was the hunting and killing of heretics, witches and Pagans. But it turns out that this was not some newfangled Christian innovation in the High Middle Ages. The Orthodox Church Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries were already dealing murderously with those they saw as their religious enemies: Pagans, Jews and Christian heretics. And if we go all the way back to the 1st and 2nd centuries AD, we have, as already noted, the sneeringly intolerant likes of Clement, Justin, Tertulian, Irenaeus and that whole bunch.

In summary: history provides exactly as much evidence for some time in the past of Christianity when violent intolerance was not an essential feature of the religion, as it does evidence for Moses parting the Red Sea.

Who Corrupted Whom?

Cornel West & Co. would have us believe that it was the acquisition of state power that corrupted the "body of Christ". In fact, however, it was the other way around. Prior to Constantine the Roman state defended religious diversity and tolerance. Dozens, if not hundreds, of religions coexisted side by side throughout the Roman world. And far from imposing its own religion, the Roman state served as a means for Egyptian, Greek, Asiatic and other religions (including Christianity and Judaism, btw!) to be spread far and wide. Ireneaus himself remarked that "through [Roman] instrumentality the world is at peace, and we walk on the highways without fear, and sail where we will." [Against Heresies IV.xxx.3] The Roman state also fostered and subsidized competing schools of philosophy, indeed: "We witness, in the course of these centuries, the the rediscovery of Aristotelianism, the final resurgence of Epicureanism, the rebirth of Pyrrhonism, a revival of Cynicism, the rebirth of Pythagoreanism, and, especially, a renewal of Platonism." [A History of Ancient Philosophy: The Schools of the Imperial Age, Gionanni Reale, John R. Catan, p. xvii]

The following passage from J.B. Bury's History of the Late Roman Empire has already been quoted in this blog, but it bears repeating at this point:

The purpose of the official cults in the pagan State [that is, Rome prior to Constantine] was to secure the protection of the deities; these were liberal and tolerant lords who raised no objection to other forms of worship; and toleration was therefore a principle of the State. But the god of the new official religion was a jealous master; he had said, "thou shalt have none other gods before me," and idolatry was an offence to him; how could his protection and favour be expected in a state in which idolatry was permitted? Intolerance was a duty, and the first business of a patriotic ruler was to take measures to extirpate the errors of paganism.
[p. 366]

But it is not enough to simply acknowledge that toleration was the rule prior to 324, and that from then onward the state was increasingly transformed into what it had not been before: an instrument for the forcible imposition of a single monolithic religion on all those under it's power. It must be emphasized that the Christian Emperors did not foist this power on a resistant, or even hesitant, Church. Rather the Church, for the next two centuries, consistently complained that that the state was not doing enough to persecute heretics and Pagans.

In fact, much of the state's culpability in the persecution of Paganism (and heresy) during the fourth and fifth centuries did not amount to an active role in persecution so much as the inaction of the state in the face of mob violence orchestrated by the Church. Here is how Peter Brown, who is certainly no anti-Christian propagandist, describes the situation in northern Africa in the early fifth century: "

the Bishops in Africa had provoked the destruction of the old ways. Public Paganism had been suppressed: the great temples were closed; the statues broken up, often by Christian mobs; the proud inscriptions ... used to pave public highways.
[Augustine of Hippo, p. 185]

Brown is here addressing the issue of anti-Pagan violence around the year 410 AD. This was not some new phenomenon, as evidenced the fact that over 20 years previously the Pagan orator Libanius had composed his famous declamation For the Temples (Pro Templis), in which he pleads to the Christian Emperor Theodosius on behalf of those few remaining Pagan temples that had not yet fallen prey to the monk-led mobs. But Christian-on-Christian violence was also rife in northern Africa during this period. Here is how Michael Gaddis describes the fate of one Donatist "heretic" in the year 347:

Isaac, a [Donatist] Christian of Carthage, had publicly confessed his faith and defied the authority of the persecuting magistrates. The enraged proconsul immediately had him seized and put to the torture. Scourged, beaten, his joints broken, his sides torn by iron claws, Isaac wore down the strength of his torturers with the endurance given him by Christ. His spirit rejoiced even as his body suffered.
[There is no Crime For Those Who Have Christ, p. 103]

According to Ramsay MacMullen at the very least there were 25,000 Christians murdered by their fellow Christians between the years 325 and 550 because of "credal differences" (see his Voting About God in Early Church Councils, especially chapter five The Violent Element).

And here is another passage from Bury, this time focusing on the relative lack of enthusiasm, up until the reign of Justinian in 529, on the part of the state for direct involvement in persecution. It is only after over two full centuries of Christian rule that the state finally succumbed completely to the intolerance of the Church!

... throughout the fifth century the severe laws against paganism were not very strictly enforced. So long as there was no open scandal, men could still believe in the old religions and disseminate anti-Christian doctrine. This comparatively tolerant attitude of the State terminated with the accession of Justinian, who had firmly resolved to realise the conception of an empire in which there should be no differences of religious opinion. Paganism was already dying slowly, and it seemed no difficult task to extinguish it entirely. There were two distinct forms in which it survived. In a few outlying places, and in some wild districts where the work of conversion had been imperfectly done, the population still indulged with impunity in heathen practices. To suppress these was a matter of administration, reinforced by missionary zeal; no new laws were required. A more serious problem was presented by the Hellenism which prevailed widely enough among the educated classes, and consequently in the State-service itself. To cope with this Justinian saw that there was need not only of new administrative rigour, but of new legislation....

Not long after his accession, he reaffirmed the penalties which previous Emperors had enacted against the pagans, and forbade all donations or legacies for the purpose of maintaining "Hellenic impiety," while in the same constitution he enjoined upon all the civil authorities and the bishops, in Constantinople and in the provinces, to inquire into cases of pagan superstition. This law was soon followed by another which made it illegal for any persons "infected with the madness of the unholy Hellenes" to teach any subject, and thereby under the pretext of education corrupt the souls of their pupils.

The persecution began with an inquisition at Constantinople. Many persons of the highest position were accused and condemned. Their property was confiscated, and some may have been put to death; one committed suicide. Among those who were involved were Thomas the Quaestor and Phocas, son of Craterus. But Phocas, a patrician of whose estimable character we have a portrait drawn by a contemporary, was speedily pardoned, for, as we saw, he was appointed Praetorian Prefect of the East after the Nika riot.

Some of the accused escaped by pretending to embrace the Christian faith, but we are told that "not long afterwards they were convicted of offering libations and sacrifices and other unholy practices." There was, in fact, a second inquisition in A.D. 546.
[pp. 367-368]

A revealing incident is the sacking of a Jewish synagogue in Callinicum (on the Euphrates river) by a Christian mob led by their local Bishop in the year 388 (this is discussed by historian Charles Freeman in his 381 AD, see especially chapter five, The Assault on Paganism). The Emperor Theodosius recommended to the local officials that the Bishop be required to personally finance the restoration of the synagogue. The famous Bishop Ambrose (of Milan) intervened and sought to convince Theodosius that his recommendation amounted to asking the obviously very devout Bishop to betray his Christian faith by materially supported Judaism. After receiving this spiritual advice the emperor withdrew his previous instructions.

By that time Theodosius had already gone further than any previous Emperor in terms of decisively supporting orthodox Nicene Christianity against all competing "heresies". But like all of his Christian predecessors, Theodosius was still concerned about the maintenance of order and civil peace, and he was also averse to openly attacking ancient, which inevitably meant non-Christian, traditions. In 382, for example, Theodosius had resisted calls, from Christians, for the closure of the great Pagan temple at Edessa:

Theodosius had replied pragmatically that because of its great artistic value, it should remain open. Yet his moderation was soon undermined by his more hotheaded Christian officals. The praetorian prefect of the east, a fellow Spaniard, Maternus Cynergius, was particular ruthless, and appears to have destroyed Edessa and its treasures. His vandalism unleashed the agression of others, notably bands of fanatical monks who delighted in the destruction of shrines.
[381 AD, Charles Freeman, p. 119]

As late as 386, Theodosius was willing to appoint Pagans to oversee the remaining Pagan sacred sites, as well as other important positions. In fact, when Cynergius, the fanatical Christian praetorian prefect responsible for the desecration at Edessa, died, Theodosius replaced him with a Pagan, Tatianus, whose son, Proclus, also a Pagan, was appointed the prefect of Constantinople (this is also discussed by Freeman in 381 AD, see especially chapter five, The Assault on Paganism). By 391 Theodosius had finally been convinced by Ambrose and other Christian counselors to dramatically increase, at least on paper, the legal proscriptions against Paganism. But for more than a century to follow the Church would continue to be disappointed at the unwillingness of the State to enforce these measures with sufficient ruthlessness.

From Samaria to Rwanda

Katongole and Wilson-Hartgrove choose to end their Sojourners article on Rwanda by citing the story of Jesus and the Samaritan woman (from the Gospel of John) as evidence that intolerance is part of "the pattern of this world", and that Christianity offers an escape from that pattern. The obvious dilemma is that the perpetrators of the violence in Rwanda were themselves Christians, and not only that, but "missionary Christianity helped create the divisions that led to genocide."

To resolve this apparent paradox, Katongole and Wilson-Hartgrove mold their argument around the claim that there is a "crisis in Western Christianity" and that we need

a new kind of Christian identity for the global body of Christ. The church’s mission is to be a new community that bears witness to the fact that in Christ there is a new identity—a unique people from “every tribe and language and people and nation” (Revelation 5:9).

As the authors point out, the sharp distinction between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda was a direct result of European colonization of Rwanda, and, in particular, was exacerbated by missionary run schools and by the Church generally:

Instead of softening the divisions between Hutu and Tutsi, the church in Rwanda amplified, intensified, and radiated them. The church played a central role in the development of a society where the Tutsi minority ruled a Hutu majority.

At first the European colonialists, including the missionaries, had tended to favor the Tutsis, whom they hoped to groom as a Europeanized elite who would serve as privileged proxies eager to do the bidding of their colonial masters (thus allowing white hands to remain relatively clean). A major problem with this plan was that those who were (artifically) designated as "Tutsis" tended to be far more resistant to Christianity than the "Hutus". In the 1950's the missionaries suddenly discovered that the "Tutsis", a ruling class more or less invented by Europeans, were the oppressors of the poor Christian Hutus! Katongole and Wilson-Hartgrove describe what happened next:

Eventually there was a “social revolution” in which Hutus took over the Rwandan government and ultimately gained independence from Belgian rule. Much of the energy for this revolution came from Catholic priests and their Hutu students. What followed in 1959 was the first ever large-scale massacre — 20,000 Tutsis were killed.

The authors point out that during this period, the Church adopted anti-colonialist rhetoric, while simultaneously continuing to exacerbate the artificial "racial categories" that were not only a product of the colonial system, but were, by design, a central part of the social machinery for perpetuating colonialism. It never appears to dawn on Katongole and Wilson-Hartgrove that they are engaging in precisely the same kind of inconsistency by focusing on certain colonial legacies while desperately trying to finesse the issue that is the 800 pound gorilla in the room: the deep historical relationship between violent intolerance and Christianity qua Christianity.

Katongole and Wilson-Hartgrove are able to dance around this issue in large part because they seem to know very little about the early history of their own religion. They don't realize, for example, that Judaism during the time of Jesus (that is, the religion professed and practiced by Jesus and all of his disciples) was already a universalist religion that engaged in proselytism throughout the Roman world (and beyond), and that converts were welcomed, regardless of their "ethnicity". Instead, they try to paint Judaism as an ethnically based religion conforming to and perpetuating the "pattern of this world".

Katongole and Wilson-Hartgrove's mischaracterization of the Judaism of Jesus' time (that is, the Judaism of Jesus) as a xenophobic religion that preached hostility to "inferior mixed-breeds" is a breathtaking oversimplification of Jewish-Samaritan relations. Worse, though, is the fact that rather than making an honest assessment of the history of their own religion, these two modern Christians insist on a self-serving circular argument. Starting from the unquestioned assertion that Christianity is, in essence (and, apparently, unlike Judaism and Paganism), a tolerant and peaceful religion, all acts of violence and intolerance are automatically ascribed to "the pattern of this world". Never mind the mind boggling contradiction involved in the fact that Katongole and Wilson-Hartgrove have included Judaism, the actual religion of Jesus, in this "pattern". And never mind the fact that such a "pattern" is not to be found in Pagan religions, and, in particular, did not exist in the Roman world prior to the "triumph" of Christianity (except precisely among those who had already embraced some form of monotheism). In fact the truth is that violent, systemic religious intolerance is historically only found wherever we find monotheism, from Akhenaten's Atenism, to the Mosaic distinction of Judaism, to Christianity, to Islam. This is the Pattern of Monotheism.

Easy Potato Soup

1 lb potatoes
1 bunch celery
one medium/large onion (or green onions)
milk
Spices: salt, dill, white pepper, caraway seeds

Obviously cut up the potatoes, onions and celery - but don't dice them. This is a good, hearty, cold-weather soup. Having real chunks of potato (especially) adds to its character.

Saute the onions in olive oil (1+ tbsp) and then add the potatoes and celery. After everyone is nicely sauted, add enough milk to about (but not completely) cover the other ingredients. Let this cook, boiling slowly over low heat, for a good 10 - 15 minutes, and then start adding spices to taste. I would say start out with 1/4 tsp of each, except for the caraway seeds, which are really the "secret" to this recipe. Add at least 1/2 tsp of the caraway seeds to start, and don't be too hesitant to add more! Total cooking time should be at least 30 minutes, or until the potatoes are done and you've gotten the spices just right!

This is very loosely based on a recipe from Recipes for a Small Planet.

Christian Demographics Fun Facts (Heart of Darkness, Part Two)

Heart of Darkness:
Part One: "By This Sign We Prosper"
Part Two: Christian Demographics Fun Facts
Part Three: Doing the Lord's Work In Rwanda
Part Four: Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from Rwanda
Part Five: Preparing the Way for Genocide in Rwanda

There are about 2 billion Christians in the world. This is 1/3 the human population. These Christians can be almost evenly divided into two categories.

Category 1: About 1 billion people are Christian today because they are descended from those who were converted over the last 500 years through a combination of enslavement, conquest and colonization.

In 1900 there were an estimated 9 million Christians in Africa, which was about 4% of the total population.

Today there are about 400-450 million Christians in Africa (about 45% of the total African population) as a direct result of missionary activity that was inextricably integrated with the colonialist "Scramble for Africa" by the European Great Powers (England, France, Italy, Germany and Belgium).

Prior to 1492 there were, obviously, no Christians in the Western Hemisphere.

Today there are very roughly 220 million Christians of indigenous descent in the Americas. This includes people categorized as indigenous, native american, amerindian, and american indian. It also includes people categorized as mestizo and latino.

There are also about 180 million Black Christians in the Americas.

(Statistics on ethnicity in Latin America can be found here. Stats for the US here.)

There are about 80 million Filipino Christians, the most significant concentration of Christians in Asia. The Philippines were Christianized as a direct result of Spanish colonialism.

Category 2: Another billion+ Christians are the descendants of those responsible for the above.

About 400 million white Christians of European descent live in the Americas.

About 600 million white Christians live in Europe itself.

At least another 100 million white Christians of European descent are spread across the rest of the world. For example, there are over 5 million Eastern Orthodox Christians in Kazakhstan of Russian or Ukrainian descent.

And just where did all these white European Christians come from? They themselves are the descendants of people who lived during centuries of theocratic rule, under which the profession of any religion other than Christianity was a crime punishable by death. That state of affairs persisted for about 1500 years of western history, and only very gradually came to an end over the last two to three centuries (see, for example, Perez Zagorin's How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West).

Voluntary, individual conversions (that is, genuine conversion of the heart) played very little role in the history of Christianity's spread in Europe (or anywhere else). Throughout the period of Christianity's expansion in Europe, any group of people who resisted Christianization were converted by force. Even in cases where conversion was not directly accompanied by bloodshed, once Christianity gained a position of strength anywhere, it was quickly "established" as the only legally allowed religion. And wherever Christianity became the state religion, there was only one monolithic form of Christianity allowed. The very concepts of religious diversity and tolerance appear to be utterly foreign to Christianity, although to a very limited extent some Christians have, over the last few centuries, begun to learn about these ideas from sources outside of their religion. That is obviously a good thing, but it does nothing to alter the historical facts about how Christianity has been spread throughout the vast majority of its history.

Nota Bene: Of all the other religions of humanity, that is, other than Christianity, only Islam has anything remotely resembling this relentless pattern of coercion, violence and intolerance century after century after century. Although Christians and Muslims don't like to hear it, this is actually good news. It means that human religion is not itself inherently and inevitably like this. And it also means that it is only very recently (relatively speaking) in human history that such aberrant, pathologically violent forms of religion have come to predominate. This dominance is due precisely to the savagery that has been employed, as a matter of course, by these two religions to not merely win new converts, but to simultaneously seek (and all too often to succeed in the attempt) to completely eradicate all other forms of religion.

Bottom Line: Nice religion ya got there.

Related posts from this blog:

• Christian Demographics Fun Facts (Nov 2, 2009)
  
• Because We Can: Syncretism from a Pagan perspective (May 25, 2010)
• "When you enter a village, swear by its Gods." (Because We Can, pt. 2) (May 26, 2010)
• Lady GaGa Prayer Candles (Because We Can, pt. 3) (May 27, 2010)
  
• Angelique Kidjo on Voodoo and Catholicism (May 29, 2010)
• More Prayer Candles, Please! (Jun 2, 2010)
  
• "On the permanent validity of the Church's missionary mandate" (What they mean by "dialogue", pt. 1) (Jul 27, 2010)
• Banding together in the Cretan fashion (Aug 20, 2010)
• "Playing the Fish" (What they mean by "dialogue", pt. 2) (Dec 27, 2010)
• The true story of how the Yaqui people were conquered and converted to Christianity (Jan 19, 2011)
• Did the Yaquis Convert to Christianity? (Jan 21, 2011)
• "We had no choice." Strategic syncretism in the face of Christianization.
• On the Non-Ineluctability of Christianization: Notes Toward a Grand Unified Theory of Pagan Resistance, Survival, and Revival (Mar 29, 2011)
• "You are ignorant of the very thing you worship" (What they mean by "dialogue", pt. 3) (Jun 30, 2011)
• Confessions of a Christian Missionary: "The old religion used to hold their life together. Now there is a void." (Nov. 28, 2011)
• An Orthodox theologian explains what he means by "Inclusivism" and "Tolerance" (Jan. 28, 2012)
• What they mean by "religious diplomacy" (May 4, 2012)